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THE LAW OF BLOCKCHAIN
Georgios Dimitropoulos*
Abstract: Blockchain technology is a new general-purpose technology that poses
significant challenges to the existing state of law, economy, and society. Blockchain has one
feature that makes it even more distinctive than other disruptive technologies: it is, by nature
and design, global and transnational. Moreover, blockchain operates based on its own rules
and principles that have a law-like quality. What may be called the lex cryptographia of
blockchain has been designed based on a rational choice vision of human behavior. Blockchain
adopts a framing derived from neoclassical economics, and instantiates it in a new machinery
that implements rational choice paradigms using blockchain in a semi-automatic way, across
all spheres of life, and without regard to borders. Accordingly, a global law and cryptoeconomics movement is now emerging owing to the spread of blockchain.
This Article suggests that such a rational choice paradigm is an insufficient foundation for
the future development of blockchain. It seeks to develop a new understanding of blockchain
and its regulation through code according to the emerging la and political econom
framework. Blockchain is much more than a machine that enables the automation of
transactions according to a rational choice framework. Blockchain should instead be
understood as a technological infrastructure. Acknowledging the infrastructural dimension of
blockchain technology may help identify a new role for the law in its interaction with
blockchain, as well as for government in its interaction with the new technology. More
precisel , identif ing blockchain as an infrastructural commons helps us recogni e that la
and regulation should not be relegated to the role of merely facilitating the operation of the
invisible hand of the market by and within blockchain, but should rather acquire more active
roles, such as safeguarding access on non-discriminatory terms to users, on a model with net
neutralit and other public utilit safeguards. The Article closes b proposing a la and
political econom frame ork for blockchain that is based on principles of publicness, trust,
and interoperability.
Keywords: cryptoasset; Bitcoin; blockchain; Ethereum; infrastructure; law and
cryptoeconomics; law and political economy
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INTRODUCTION
New technologies are testing legal systems and society at large.
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, and blockchain
technology are changing existing social patterns and putting pressure on
the legal status quo. While much discussed, blockchain is relatively little
understood. As this Article describes, blockchain is a digital ledger that
operates on a decentralized peer-to-peer digital network of computers and
facilitates online transaction of many kinds.
Blockchain has one feature that makes it even more distinctive than any
other disruptive innovation: it is by nature and design a global,
transnational technology.1 It was developed explicitly to circumvent
national borders and established institutions. Blockchain facilitates the
transmission of data and economic value independent of the geographical
location of the participants in the blockchain net ork ( the nodes ).
New technologies have historically had a transformational impact on
the economy. Capital accounting in the form of the double-entry
bookkeeping system is considered to be one of the most important
foundations of modern capitalism.2 Blockchain is arguably the most
significant development in accounting since double-entry bookkeeping.
Containerization, or the use of standard shipping containers, is said to
have revolutionized international trade and facilitated globalization in the
way we know it today.3 Blockchain looks likel to become the soft are
equivalent of the shipping container in its facilitation of international
trade.4
The potential influence of blockchain on contemporary society,
economy, and law becomes even more apparent considering the various
areas in which blockchain is used.5 The first and still most important
1. Primavera De Filippi & Samer Hassan, Blockchain Technology as a Regulatory Technology:
From
Code
is
Law
to
Law
is
Code,
FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/download/7113/5657 [https://perma.cc/T24L4CH3]; MICH LE FINCK, BLOCKCHAIN REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 58 (2018).
2. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 93 95 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968); see
also Bruce G. Carruthers & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Accounting for Rationality: Double-Entry
Bookkeeping and the Rhetoric of Economic Rationality, 97 AM. J. SOCIO. 31 (1991).
3. See Daniel M. Bernhofen et al., Estimating the Effects of the Container Revolution on World
Trade, 98 J. INT L ECON. 36 (2016).
4. In the same way that the shipping container provided the hardware for international trade,
Blockchain may become the software for the further facilitation of international trade. See
EMMANUELLE GANNE, CAN BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTIONIZE INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 44 (2018).
5. See generally Joshua A.T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (2015); Joshua
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application of blockchain is the facilitation of cryptocurrencies and other
cryptoassets.6 Bitcoin and the cryptocurrency movement emerged during
the global financial crisis of 2008.7 Bitcoin was an effort to bypass the
mainstream global financial system.8 At the same time, cryptoassets and
blockchain are undoubtedly the product of globalization a
fundamentally global technology designed to bypass national and physical
boundaries, they are both causes and consequences of globalization.
Since the creation of Bitcoin, the importance of cryptocurrencies has
steadily increased. The price of Bitcoin first exceeded the price of an
ounce of gold on March 3, 2017.9 Cryptocurrencies have exponentially
multiplied since,10 and a separate categor of cr ptoassets has been
developed. Cryptoassets are expected to become mainstream assets in the
near future.11 The explosion of the cryptocurrency market has predictably
led to a regulatory backlash, a reaction by governments around the world
to protect national interests and re-embed money into national
jurisdictions.12 The regulatory response has taken multiple forms, and
Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE
35 (2014); David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REV. FIN. 7 (2017); Carla L.
Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384 (2017); Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell,
Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313 (2017); Robinson Randolph, The New Digital Wild West:
Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REV. 897 (2018); Jonathan Rohr &
Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of
Public Capital Markets (Cardozo Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 527, Univ. of Tenn. Legal Stud.,
Research Paper No. 338, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048104
[https://perma.cc/UV52-F987].
6. See generally FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., GUIDANCE ON CRYPTOASSETS (2019),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3E9-LPYT];
CRYPTOASSETS: LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND MONETARY PERSPECTIVES (Chris Brummer ed., 2019);
FIN. STABILITY BD., CRYPTOASSETS: WORK UNDERWAY, REGULATORY APPROACHES AND
POTENTIAL GAPS (2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P310519.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VGP6-THP6]; Syren Johnstone, Taxonomies of Digital Assets: Recursive or
Progressive?, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL Y 78 (2019).
7. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM (2008),
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/V766-N32V].
8. Id. at 1.
9. The price closed at $1,268 while a troy ounce of gold stood at $1,233. Rishi Iyengar, Bitcoin
Price
Exceeds
Gold
for
First
Time
Ever,
CNN
BUS.
(Mar. 3, 2017),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/03/03/investing/bitcoin-gold-price-value/index.html
[https://perma.cc/R8VL-PWV4].
10. The website CoinMarketCap lists more than 2,371 cryptocurrencies. See All Cryptocurrencies,
COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all [https://perma.cc/G4MD-ZA6S].
11. See generally Crypto-Assets: Implications for Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, and
Payments and Market Infrastructures, ECB Occasional Paper Series, Eur. Cent. Bank, No. 223 (May
2019).
12. Georgios Dimitropoulos, Global Currencies and Domestic Regulation: Embedding through
Enabling?, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 112 (Philipp
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largely depends on how the relevant legal actors perceive the threat posed
by cryptoassets and their underlying technology.13
Blockchain technology as such and related blockchain markets are
becoming more important as well.14 Blockchain technology is a generalpurpose technology that can be used to achieve multiple goals; while it
was initially developed as Bitcoin blockchain to by-pass commercial
Hacker et al. eds., 2019) [hereinafter REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN].
13. Accordingly, the literature on the legal aspects of cryptocurrencies and other cryptoassets has
been expanding. See Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159 (2012); Tracey A. Anderson, Bitcoin Is it Just a Fad? History,
Current Status and Future of the Cyber-Currency Revolution, 29 J. INT L BANKING L. & REGUL. 428
(2014); Alexandre Mallard et al., The Paradoxes of Distributed Trust: Peer-to-Peer Architecture and
User Confidence in Bitcoin, J. PEER PROD., 2014; PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT,
BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE (2018); BLOCKCHAIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY
REGULATION (Josias Dewey ed., 1st ed. 2019),
https://www.acc.com/sites/default/files/resources/vl/membersonly/Article/1489775_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RJ2Q-RGNH]; REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN, supra note 12.
The issue of the regulation of cryptocurrencies has been prominent in the literature, again with a
focus on Bitcoin. See Joshua J. Doguet, Comment, The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory
Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. REV. 1119 (2013); Andres
Guadamuz, Virtual Currency and Virtual Property Revisited, TECHNOLLAMA (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://bit.ly/1MaeW4N [https://perma.cc/6KZQ-MHXA]; Primavera De Filippi, Bitcoin: A
Regulatory Nightmare to a Libertarian Dream, INTERNET POL Y REV., May 23, 2014; GLOB. LEGAL
RSCH. DIRECTORATE STAFF, LAW LIBR. OF CONG., REGULATION OF BITCOIN IN SELECTED
JURISDICTIONS (2014), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/bitcoin-survey/regulation-of-bitcoin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5G94-EU94]; Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating
Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues and Future Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 813 (2014); Jerry Brito et al., Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction
Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144 (2014); Nicholas A. Plassaras,
Comment, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin Within the Reach of the IMF, 14 CHI. J.
INT L L. 377 (2013); Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation
in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271 (2015); Omri Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the
Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 53 (2015); Andres Guadamuz & Chris Marsden,
Blockchains and Bitcoin: Regulatory Responses to Cryptocurrencies, FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 14,
2015), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/6198/5163 [https://perma.cc/6QDWM4ZC]; Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359 (2016); Michèle
Finck, Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown, 19 GERMAN L.J. 665 (2018); JEFFREY H. MATSUURA,
DIGITAL CURRENCY: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE GUIDE (2018).
The views in legal commentary range from scholars against, in favor, and in favor of minimal
regulation. Compare Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and
the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111 (2012), and Joe Myers, Joseph
Stiglitz: Bitcoin Ought to Be Outlawed, WORLD ECON. F. (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/joseph-stiglitz-bitcoin-ought-to-be-outlawed/
[https://perma.cc/7N3V-VWBE], with Daniela Sonderegger, A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity:
Bitcoin Needs Just a Bit of Regulation, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & POL Y 175 (2015).
14. Blockchain Market Worth $39.7 Billion by 2025, MARKETSANDMARKETS,
https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/blockchain-technology.asp
[https://perma.cc/468K-4RCA] ( [S]i e is e pected to gro from USD 3.0 billion in 2020 to USD
39.7 billion by 2025 . . . . ).
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financial institutions and central banks, it was later welcomed by various
private commercial actors as well as public bodies. Both the private sector
and the government already have or are in the process of adopting the
technology.
The adoption of blockchain, particularly by governments, does not
come without challenges. According to de Filippi and Wright,
blockchains accelerate the shift of po er from legal rules and regulations
administered by government authorities to code-based rules and protocols
governed by decentralized blockchain-based net orks. 15 It has been
suggested, moreover, that blockchain and other distributed ledgers are
the strongest challenge e er posed to the monopol of the state o er the
promulgation, formation, keeping and verification of institutions and the
public record. 16 This is because trust in blockchain may be in the position
to replace trust in and through the government.17 According to Satoshi
Nakamoto, the pseudonymous developer of Bitcoin, blockchain
technology can lead to a society where self-enforcing rules will supplant
traditional laws.18 As one of the developers of the Ethereum blockchain
puts it, blockchain creates a ne kind of legal s stem. 19 Drawing on the
notion of lex informatica,20 scholars today even speak of the development
of a lex cryptographia within blockchain.21
But blockchain may prove to be even more than that not just a case
in which code is law, but also a new application of law as code.22
15. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 7.
16. Brendan Marke To ler, Anarchy, Blockchain and Utopia: A Theory of PoliticalSocioeconomic Systems Organised Using Blockchain, 1 J. BRIT. BLOCKCHAIN ASS N 13, 13 (2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3095343 [https://perma.cc/2TC8-3AW4].
17. See generally KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST
(2018).
18. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 7.
19. Andy, The Future of the Blockchain: Interview with Ethereum Co-founder Gavin Wood,
SIMPLEWEB (Sept. 18, 2017), https://simpleweb.co.uk/the-future-of-the-blockchain-interview-withethereum-co-founder-gavin-wood/ [https://perma.cc/NVN3-9DRC].
20. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998). This terminology reflects the supposedly autonomous
merchant la of the Middle Ages, the lex mercatoria. Id. at 553.
21. Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of
Lex Cryptographia (Mar. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 [https://perma.cc/GHP3-MUWG].
22. See De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 1; Karen Yeung, Regulation by Blockchain: The Emerging
Battle for Supremacy Between the Code of Law and Code as Law, 82 MOD. L. REV. 207 (2018); Carla
L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology
Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191 (2016); Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing
Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384 (2017); see also infra section I.B. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG,
CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) (on the idea of code as law).
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Governments all over the world are accordingly revealing an uneasiness
with the rise of blockchain and its accompanying functionalities.23 While
the initial focus of regulators and scholars alike has been mostly on
cryptocurrencies, the focus is starting to shift towards the technology
supporting cryptocurrencies.24 The law of blockchain is shaped by the
nature of the technology, its uses, as well as the efforts at various levels
of governance to regulate it. The Article identifies two layers of
interaction between traditional law and blockchain: the law within
blockchain, which has been termed lex cryptographia, and the law of the
interaction between the real world and the online world.25
The most pressing issue for legal scholars working in the area of
blockchain as well as law and technology more broadly is the role of
the law in its interaction with new technologies. In the 20th century,

23. This concern was showcased in the reaction of Members of Congress and other U.S. officials
during a Senate Banking Committee hearing on Facebook s planned blockchain-backed currency,
Libra. See Jack Kelly, Facebook s Libra Comes Under Fire in Senate Hearing Here s Why
Congress Is Terrified, FORBES (July 16, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2019/07/16/facebooks-libra-comes-under-fire-in-senatehearing-heres-why-congress-is-terrified/#45f2537736b4 [https://perma.cc/A4M4-QLVA]. There
seems to be a change in the perception of the need for the federal government to intervene in the
sphere of blockchain technology and cryptoassets, not in a restricting but rather enabling manner. See
infra section I.C (on the various types of interventions adopted by regulators around the world,
including at the federal and the state level in the United States). A proposal has been even put on the
table for the introduction of a U.S. digital dollar. The COVID-19 pandemic crisis must have played
a role in this change of heart. See generally Jason Brett, Congress Has Now Introduced 32 Crypto
and Blockchain Bills, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2020/04/28/congress-has-introduced-32-crypto-andblockchain-bills-for-consideration-in-2019-2020/#3b64e34f1d61 [https://perma.cc/9VVF-GDGY].
On the other side of the Atlantic, the French Finance Minister, Bruno Le Maire, called Libra a threat
to national so ereignt . See Bruno Le Maire, Facebook s Libra Is a Threat to National Sovereignt ,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/bf2f588e-ef63-11e9-a55a-30afa498db1b
[https://perma.cc/D67C-CX9B].
24. Various types of laws come into play for the regulation of blockchain, most importantly, data
protection laws, and particularly within the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). See 2016 O.J. (L 679) (on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 1995 O.J. (L 281) (GDPR)); infra
section I.C.
25. I have called this else here blockchain la . See Georgios Dimitropoulos, Blockchain Law:
Between Public and Private, Transnational and Domestic, in THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW (Takis Tridimas & Mateja Durovic eds., forthcoming 2020); cf. also Stéphane Blemus, Law and
Blockchain: A Legal Perspective on Current Regulatory Trends Worldwide, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
DE DROIT FINANCIER [REV. TRIM. DR. FIN.] , no. 4, 2017, at 1; Reyes, supra note 5; Usha Rodrigues,
Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679 (2018); João Pedro Quintais et al., Blockchain and
the Law: A Critical Evaluation, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL Y 86 (2019). See generally THE
STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds.,
2006); Mark Taylor & Matteo Matteucci, Virtual Worlds, 15 COMPUT. & TELECOMM. L. REV. 124
(2009) (on law in the virtual world).
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rational choice theor s focus on using incenti es to direct human
behavior has influenced lawmaking.26 Accordingly, the law may only be
required to structure incentives for technology so that technology
develops in accordance with policy objectives.27 Importantly, blockchain
is also a regulatory technology, as it guides the behavior of individuals
operating in the blockchain network. This behavior-steering result is
achie ed through the use of hat has been called cr pto-economics. 28
Blockchain technology embeds cryptoeconomic principles facilitating its
internal operations and uses, based largely on rational choice theory.29 It
allows for the application of the rational choice paradigm in a semiautomatic way and on a global scale. Regulators and scholars working in
this area need to be mindful of this capacity for several reasons. It is now
well understood that rational choice theory does not always describe
human agency with accuracy: Developments in the social sciences such
as behavioral economics have proven this point repeatedly.30
Accordingly, governments may have to intervene to protect blockchain
participants and affected third parties.31 Overall, we need a new
framework for understanding and regulating blockchain technology.
Blockchain is much more than a mechanism that assumes that
individuals are rational, and allows for the automation of transactions.
Blockchain can be understood as a technological infrastructure.32
Acknowledging the infrastructural dimension of blockchain technology
26. See generally Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 487 (1994).
27. See FINCK, supra note 1, at 118.
28. See generally Rainer Böhme et al., Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance, 29 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 213 (2015); Sinclair Davidson et al., Economics of Blockchain (Mar. 9, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN) [hereinafter Davidson et al., Economics of
Blockchain], https://ssrn.com/abstract=2744751 [https://perma.cc/SZ73-B9HD]; Sinclair Davidson
et al., Disrupting Governance: The New Institutional Economics of Distributed Ledger Technology
(July 22, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811995
[https://perma.cc/J7AE-CZ9J]; Roman Beck et al., Governance in the Blockchain Economy: A
Framework and Research Agenda, 19 J. ASS N FOR INFO. SYS. 1020 (2018); CHRIS BERG ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING THE BLOCKCHAIN ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTION TO INSTITUTIONAL
CRYPTOECONOMICS (2019); see also Cryptoeconomics Lab, MIT, https://ce.mit.edu/
[https://perma.cc/JQA9-WCD6].
29. See infra section II.A.
30. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998) (on the application of behavioral economics in the law).
31. See infra section III.C.1 (on the risks posed by cryptoassets and blockchain technology overall).
32. See also Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A
Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL Y 837 (2015); see also DE FILIPPI
& WRIGHT, supra note 13; FINCK, supra note 1, at 66 (noting that blockchains ha e an e traordinar
potential to form a regulator infrastructure go erning humans and machines ).
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may help identify a new role for the law in its interaction with blockchain,
as well as for government in its interaction with the technology. More
precisely, this Article presents the argument that blockchain should be
understood as an infrastructural commons. Accordingl , la and
regulation should not be relegated to the role of facilitating the operation
of the invisible hand of the market by and within blockchain, but should
pursue more interventionary tasks, such as safeguarding access on nondiscriminator terms to potential users on the model of net neutralit . 33
The Article discusses the political economy of blockchain at two levels:
at the le el of the societal econom of the lex cryptographia, and the
interaction between blockchain technology and the lex cryptographia of
the digital world, on the one side, and the ordinary law of the physical
world, on the other. It presents three phases of such interaction: the
anarcho-libertarian phase, the mainstreaming phase, and the maturity
phase. The phases present a different mix between public and private,
transnational and domestic laws and values. A law shaping the interaction
between lex cryptographia and the mainstream legal system is in the
process of being developed, and the Article suggests that it should feature
the following three characteristics and values: enabling public and
permissionless blockchains; allowing for trust in blockchain to operate
with the support of governmental trust; and bridging the gaps and creating
interoperability between the public and the private, as well as the physical
and the non-physical world.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the rise of blockchain
and cryptoassets in recent years, as well as the consequences that their

33. The notion of infrastructure is directly linked to the idea of the commons. See BRETT M.
FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 1 9, 10 21, 59 72
(2012). Infrastructure is becoming more important as a conceptual category for the analysis of all
areas of law. See id.; Benedict Kingsbury, Infrastructure and InfraReg: On Rousing the International
Law Wi ards of Is, 8 CAMBRIDGE INT L L.J. 171 (2019) (putting forward the idea of developing a
conceptual frame ork for the understanding and anal sis of international la in terms of thinking
infrastructurall ); see also InfraReg, INST. FOR INT L L. & JUST., https://www.iilj.org/infrareg/
[https://perma.cc/J9DE-SE67]; Claire Schupmann, Blockchain as an Emerging Cross-Border
Payments Infrastructure (Inst. for Int l L. & Just., Emerging Scholars Paper No. 28, 2017). In a similar
vein, legal scholarship is rediscovering the importance of space in governance. See Sarah Blandy &
David Sibley, Law, Boundaries and the Production of Space, 19 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 275 (2010);
Luigi Nuzzo, Spatial and Temporal Dimensions of Legal History: International Law, Foreign Policy,
and the Construction of a Legal Order, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICY: DRAWING
AND MANAGING BOUNDARIES FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT (Gunther Hellmann et al. eds.,
2016); Ran Hirschl & Ayelet Shachar, Spatial Statism, 17 INT L J. CONST. L. 387 (2019) (as well as
the other articles of the special issue).
Primavera De Filippi discusses the related issue of commons-based peer production and its
relationship to commons-based cr ptocurrencies. See Primavera De Filippi, Translating CommonsBased Peer Production Values into Metrics: Toward Commons-Based Cryptocurrencies, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCIES 463, 474 79 (David Lee ed., 2015).
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development has had on the legal system. The uses of blockchain have
exponentially grown from cryptocurrencies to the mainstreaming of
cryptoassets to the adoption of the technology by private sector and
government. The process of recognition, control, and adoption is largely
influenced b ho the legal order of the ph sical (i.e., non-digital)
world understands blockchain and cryptoassets, whether as money,
commodity, or technology. Part II delves into the underlying regulatory
techniques that blockchain has adopted to steer the behavior of blockchain
participants. Blockchain rules invariably use incentive structures for the
coordination of behavior in the cryptoenvironment that derive from
rational choice economics. The result is a new law and economics of
blockchain. But blockchain is much more than a mechanism for the
automatic execution of transactions through the incentivization of
individual behavior. It is an infrastructure that operates at a global scale
facilitating a great variety of actions in all aspects of life. Part III presents
the interaction bet een the ordinar
ph sical legal order, and
blockchain technology, and proposes a new framework for the lex
cryptographia as well as the interaction between the law of the analog and
the digital cr pto orld dra ing on the emerging la and political
econom mo ement.34 Specifically, this Article argues that a reformed
la of blockchain should have the following three aims: enabling public
and permissionless blockchains; allowing for trust in blockchain to
operate with the support of governmental trust; and bridging the gaps by
creating interoperability between the public and the private, as well as the
physical and digital world.
I.

BLOCKCHAIN AS (LEGAL) CODE

Blockchain is a new technology that shares some of the features of
other disrupti e technologies, hile being distinctl a global technolog
of technologies in that it facilitates interactions across borders. The first
section of this Part discusses the technological features underlying the rise
of blockchain in the private and public sector. The Part then proceeds to
discuss the nature of blockchain as a special case of code as la as well
as la as code. The final section of this Part closes ith an e amination
34. Jedediah Britton-Purdy et al., Building a Law and Political Economy Framework: Beyond the
Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020) (presenting a framework for identifying and
critiquing the way the law has been understood since the twentieth century, as well as offering a new
law-and-political-economy approach to legal scholarship). The law and political economy
framework for blockchain is fine-tuned through the Polan ian concept of embeddedness. See KARL
POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME
(1944). The first mention of the idea of embeddedness of economic institutions into social relations
is in Karl Polan i s The Great Transformation. Id. at 60.
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of the various ways in which legal orders have responded to the rise of the
cryptoworld.
A.

The Rise of Blockchain

1.

Technological Features of Blockchain Technology

Blockchain technology is much-discussed but little understood. The
co-founder of Ethereum, one of the most successful blockchains, uses an
apt definition of blockchain:
A blockchain is a magic computer that anyone can upload
programs to and leave the programs to self-execute, where the
current and all previous states of every program are always
publicly visible, and which carries a very strong
cryptoeconomically secured guarantee that programs running on
the chain will continue to execute in exactly the way that the
blockchain protocol specifies.35
This definition presents blockchain as a magical apparatus with the
capacity to create new economic and social institutions a statement that
obscures more than it illuminates. This section breaks down some of the
features of blockchain technology with less hyperbole.36
At the most visible level, a blockchain is a digital ledger that operates
on a decentralized peer-to-peer net ork of computers ( nodes ).37
Blockchain technology is a relatively new technology, which relies on
previous innovations, primarily Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)
and cryptography. A blockchain is a digital database, which takes shape
as a sequence of blocks in the form of a chain. Drawing on DLT, the ledger
is not centrall managed, but rather distributed, meaning it is shared
among all participants of the network. In addition, the ledger records
transactions among parties in a secure and permanent way through means
35. Vitalik Buterin, Visions, Part 1: The Value of Blockchain Technology, ETHEREUM BLOG (Apr.
13, 2015), https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/04/13/visions-part-1-the-value-of-blockchain-technology/
[https://perma.cc/JV8Y-28MB].
36. There are various accounts on the function and operation of blockchain. This is due to the fact
that the different blockchain ecosystems operate sometimes based on different rule-sets that deviate
from the Bitcoin blockchain. See generally ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN (2d
ed. 2017).
37. There are of course other technological innovations that use peer-to-peer networks, such as
filesharing websites like Napster or BitTorrent. See generally Srikanta Pradhan et al., Blockchain
Based Security Framework for P2P Filesharing System, 2018 IEEE INT L CONF. ON ADVANCED
NETWORKS & TELECOMMS. SYS., May 2019, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8710078
[https://perma.cc/4ZKU-VXRD] (discussing peer-to-peer networks and how blockchain can be used
to improve security on peer-to-peer networks).
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of cryptography. DLT has made possible the connection of blocks of
information as an online distributed database. Blockchain uses
cryptography to link the blocks with a view to making it impossible to
exchange transaction data.
In a blockchain, users submit their transactions for example, the
transfer of Bitcoins or Ethers or uploading of medical files to the
network. The transactions are recorded pseudonymously, as blockchain
participants can remain and operate through pseudonyms.38 Pseudonymity
is guaranteed through multiple encryption and cryptographic techniques
such as hashing functions that create information pseudonyms and
ke generators (or ke gens ). Ke gens create cr ptographic ke s that
are strings of numbers and letters with the use of very advanced
mathematics involving prime numbers. There are two sets of keys that are
used in all transactions: public and pri ate. Public ke s are allets, or
addresses publicly visible to all nodes; private keys are used as digital
signatures for the conduct of transactions and are therefore to be kept
secret.39
The transactions are added to new blocks by miners that propose the
new blocks. Before a block can be added to the chain, a cryptographic
puzzle must be solved, creating the block. Miners are special nodes that
place transactions in a block by successfully solving a Proof of Work
(PoW) or other problems. PoW is a system that requires some work from
the miner, usually processing power by a computer. Producing a PoW is
a random process with low probability, so normally a lot of trial and error
is required for a valid PoW to be generated. When it comes to Bitcoins,
for example, a hash is what serves as a PoW. A hash is another string of
numbers and letters. A hash function is a cryptographic mathematical
function that transforms a variable number of characters into a string with
a fixed number of characters. Even small changes in the original string
create a completely new hash. Hashing is thus a cryptographic tool that
allows the pseudonymization of the information included in the relevant
transaction.40
The node that solves the puzzle shares the solution with all the other
computers in the network. All nodes in the network verify the PoW, and
38. Most cryptocurrencies are not completely anonymous. See EDWARD V. MURPHY ET AL., CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R43339, BITCOIN: QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2015),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43339.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WDM-MLAN].
39. See How Blockchain Technology Works: Guide for Beginners, COINTELEGRAPH,
https://cointelegraph.com/bitcoin-for-beginners/how-blockchain-technology-works-guide-forbeginners [https://perma.cc/3EZG-5ZGZ].
40. Id.
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if found to be correct and approved by an electronic consensus, a block is
added to the chain. If a miner produces a block that is approved by an
electronic consensus, then the miner is rewarded with coins or tokens. The
block reward is not the only incentive for miners to keep running their
hardware. Miners also get transaction fees that users pay. Even though the
fees are usually voluntary on the part of the sender, miners will always
prioritize transfers with higher transaction fees. That is why the
blockchain econom has been characteri ed as a fee econom . 41
After a successful transfer which goes through a process of successful
mining and verification a new block is created as part of the ledger. The
ledger is decentralized and distributed across a network of computers.
Blocks are linked together in a chronological order forming a continuous
line, i.e., a chain of blocks hence, blockchain. A block contains a
timestamp, a reference to the previous block in the form of the hash of
that block, the transactions and the computational problem that had to be
solved before the block went on the chain and the hash of the last block.
This complex process purports to do away with intermediaries and
replace trust in them with trust in the digital decentralized cryptographic
s stem, a trustless trust achie ed through peer-to-peer interaction.42
Blockchain technolog is trustless in that it does not require third part
verification. Instead, it uses a consensus mechanism with cryptoeconomic
incentives to transcribe a transaction in the distributed database.
Blockchain technology thus has certain attributes that differentiate it
from other new innovations. It can be used for the registration and transfer
of data of all types such as information as well as assets; it is
decentralized; it is tamper-proof; it is transnational. The first defining
feature of blockchain is decentralization. Blockchain relies on a
decentralized peer-to-peer network. Each participant maintains a copy of
a shared ledger of digitally signed transactions. Moreover, all copies are
maintained in synchronization when a transaction takes place through a
protocol in the form of PoW or Proof of Stake (PoS).43 In addition, a
blockchain electronic ledger is tamper-proof, in the sense that transactions
41. See infra section II.A.
42. See Kevin Werbach, Trust, But Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, 33 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 487, 497 98 (2018) (citing Reid Hoffman, Reid Hoffman: Why the Blockchain Matters,
WIRED (May 15, 2015), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/bitcoin-reid-hoffman
[https://perma.cc/VU4U-LV5M]) (on the notion of trustless trust ); see also Primavera de Filippi,
Blockchain Technology and Decentralized Governance: The Pitfalls of a Trustless Dream (2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with HAL), https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal02445179/document [https://perma.cc/5XL9-F7QP].
43. See infra section II.A (for a definition of Proof of Stake (PoS) as well as a discussion about the
differences between PoW and PoS).
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in blockchain are generally irreversible, which makes blockchain almost
immutable.44
There are two main types of blockchain: public and private.45 For
public blockchains, there is no specific entity that manages the digital
platform. In the case of private blockchains, the ledger is controlled by a
single entity or managed by a consortium of companies. There are
moreover
permissionless
and
permissioned
blockchains.46
Permissionless blockchains are accessible by everyone, while for
permissioned blockchains restrictions can be imposed on who can access
and change the blocks. Private or consortium blockchains use such
restricted access protocols. Two of the most important blockchains,
Bitcoin and Ethereum, are public permissionless blockchains. They can
be accessed and used by any person with access to a computer
anywhere in the world. The software Bitcoin uses, for example, is
completely open source and available for anyone to download, modify,
and create their own version, which then becomes a new cryptocurrency
regime.47 There are also hybrid public-private blockchains, in which
nodes with private access can see all the information in particular
blockchains, while the others cannot, or the other way around.48
Blockchain is rapidly evolving from a technology for information to a
technology for value transfer to a broader technolog for
decentrali ation. 49 Blockchain is nowadays understood as a new
general-purpose technolog . 50 Blockchain is characterized by its
malleability, as it can be used in multiple organizational and social
contexts. Public permissionless blockchains, in particular, are a generalpurpose technology that can be used to achieve multiple goals.
Blockchains promise to constitute a profound paradigm shift regarding

44. See FINCK, supra note 1, at 30 (using the term tamper-e ident ). The reason that it is preferable
to speak of a tamper-proof quality of blockchain ledgers rather than immutability is that blockchain
is susceptible to the so-called 51% attack. Parties that control at least 51% of the erification po er
on blockchain, such as 51% computing power, can generally tamper with transactions. See Walch,
supra note 32, at 861 65.
45. See, e.g., Karl Wüst & Arthur Gervais, Do You Need a Blockchain?, CRYPTO VALLEY CONF.
ON BLOCKCHAIN TECH., 2018, at 45, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8525392
[https://perma.cc/885K-9TKF] (on the differentiations between public and private, as well as
permissionless and permissioned blockchains).
46. Id.
47. This availability has led to an explosion of altcoins. See infra section I.A.2.a.
48. See Wüst & Gervais, supra note 45, at 48.
49. Davidson et al., Economics of Blockchain, supra note 28, at 6.
50. See generally Timothy F. Bresnahan & M. Trajtenberg, General Purpose Technologies
Engines of Growth?, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS 83 (1995).
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data collection, sharing and processing and to trigger related revisions of
socio-economic and political arrangements that depend on data-sharing
and transaction.51 In a broader sense, blockchain technolog is being
lauded as transformative for every human practice that uses recordkeeping
(so, all of them). 52
2.

Applications of Blockchain Technology

Cryptocurrencies and the broader category of cryptoassets helped
spearhead blockchain technology, but blockchain technology is much
more than a technology for cryptoassets. Blockchain technology can help
transfer any type of data and information, not restricted to the transfer of
digitized value. Blockchains are a general-purpose technology
particularly in their public permissionless form with a very wide range
of applications. Blockchains can replace paper documents with digital
ones stored in a tamper-proof ledger. Businesses in almost all industries
are exploring ways to take advantage of these features of blockchain. In
addition, governments are also trying to stay on top of these developments
and explore the opportunities that blockchain technology may provide for
the distribution and transformation of government services. This section
discusses some current applications of blockchain technology in the
private and the public sectors.
a.

Cryptocurrencies and Other Cryptoassets

Cryptoassets are digital assets in which cryptographic techniques are
used to regulate the generation of units of an asset and to verify the
transfer of those units between parties in a decentralized way i.e.,
without a central party via a blockchain.53 The original developers of
cryptoassets were Financial Technology (FinTech) companies. Most
cryptoasset class categories have moved from FinTech startups to
mainstream financial institutions, as well as big tech companies. A decade
after the emergence of Bitcoin, a boom in both number and type of
cryptoassets has taken place. Among these, Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)

51. FINCK, supra note 1, at 1.
52. Angela Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust, Software Developers as Fiduciaries in Public
Blockchains, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 58, 58 59
(Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019).
53. FIN. STABILITY BD., CRYPTO-ASSET MARKETS: POTENTIAL CHANNELS FOR FUTURE
FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS (2018), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P101018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9YUH-X3P3]; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., CRYPTOASSETS IN ASIA:
CONSUMER ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOURS AND EXPERIENCES 10 (2019).
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or token sales first started to appear in 2013.54 Since then, the number
of ICOs has grown exponentially. ICOs are financial ventures based on
cryptocurrencies. They emerged as a way of raising capital and as a
solution for entrepreneurs looking to attract funding for their startups.55
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), ICOs consist of the creation of digital tokens by
start-up companies . . . and their distribution to investors in exchange for
fiat currenc or, in most cases, mainstream cr ptocurrencies. 56
Cryptoassets are tokens that have a value in the digital world. There are
three main categories of cryptoassets. First, there are payment tokens, i.e.,
digital means of payment or exchange, often referred to as
cryptocurrencies, although cryptocurrencies are nowadays only one type
of cryptoasset. Second, there are utility tokens that grant digital access to
specific digital platforms and services. And third, there are security
tokens, i.e., asset-backed tokens representing ownership interests in
property.57
The most popular category is payment tokens, or cryptocurrencies.
Cryptocurrencies are not necessarily identical to virtual currencies.
Virtual currencies ha e been defined as a digital representation of
value, not issued by a central bank, credit institution or e-money
institution, which in some circumstances can be used as an alternative to
mone . 58 The term cr ptocurrenc is used to refer to an irtual
currency that relies on peer-to-peer cryptography for the validation of
alue transfers. The term altcoin is also er often used in this conte t,
mostl to describe irtual currencies e cept for the dollar of

54. See generally Shaanan Cohney et al., Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591
(2019).
55. See Sabrina Howell et al., Initial Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with Cryptocurrency Token
Sales, VOX EU (July 23, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/financing-growth-cryptocurrency-tokensales [https://perma.cc/CPG2-LGKE].
56. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS (ICOS) FOR SME FINANCING 9
(2019), www.oecd.org/finance/initial-coin-offerings-for-sme-financing.htm [https://perma.cc/US7ZH6Q5].
57. APOLLINE BLANDIN ET AL., CAMBRIDGE CTR. FOR ALT. FIN., GLOBAL CRYPTOASSET
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE STUDY (2018),
https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/centres/alternativefinance/downloads/2019-04-ccaf-global-cryptoasset-regulatory-landscape-study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9FL-D232]. The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) has
also made a distinction between payment tokens, utility tokens, and asset tokens. See FINMA,
GUIDELINES FOR ENQUIRIES REGARDING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR INITIAL COIN
OFFERINGS (2018).
58. EUR. CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES A FURTHER ANALYSIS (2015).
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cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin.59 There are no limits to the number of altcoins
that can be developed and released.60
Stablecoins are one of the latest developments in the field of
cryptoassets. In contrast with the first generation of cryptoassets, the value
of a stablecoin is pegged to one or more external sources such as fiat
currency or commodities. Stablecoins may be public or private. One
e ample of a pri ate stablecoin is Libra, the planned blockchain-based
currency of Facebook. Libra is designed as a stablecoin with a steady
value 100% backed by a basket of securities and fiat currencies such as
the dollar, euro, pound and yen.61 Libra will be run by the Libra
Association, an independent, not-for-profit membership organization,
headquartered in Geneva, and supported by private companies, such as
Facebook, Uber, and Vodafone, as well as non-profit organizations.62 At
the same time, some central banks for example, in China, Sweden and
Switzerland have started to explore the possibility of developing their
own version of stablecoins, so-called Central Bank Digital Currencies
(CBDCs).63
Domestic legal orders have had great difficulty in grappling with
cryptocurrencies and other cryptoassets. Being decentralized and global
in nature, they cannot be identified as legal tender in the same way as
national currencies. In the United States, only the U.S. dollar is legal

59. For a definition of Bitcoin, see Guadamuz & Marsden, supra note 13, at 2.2 ( Bitcoin is a nonfiat cr ptographic electronic pa ment s stem that purports to be the orld s first cr ptocurrenc . In
other words, it is a peer-to-peer, client-based, completely distributed currency that does not depend
on centralised [sic] issuing bodies (a so ereign ) to operate. The alue is created b users, and the
operation is distributed using an open source client that can be installed on any computer or mobile
de ice. ).
60. [T]he Internet of money will be less concerned with creating one coin to rule them all, than it
ill be about finding one rule to coin them all. See GRANT K. NIVEN ET AL., WORLD GOV T SUMMIT
& ERNST & YOUNG, THE FUTURE OF MONEY: BACK TO THE FUTURE THE INTERNET OF MONEY 7
(2017). In practice, there are only a few real alternatives that implement minor or major changes to
the Bitcoin software; these are known as forks. See Adam Hayes, The Decision to Produce Altcoins:
Miners Arbitrage in Cryptocurrency Markets (Mar. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
SSRN), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2579448 [https://perma.cc/VAK4ESR2].
61. LIBRA ASS N MEMBERS, LIBRA WHITE PAPER V2.0 (2020), https://libra.org/en-US/whitepaper/#cover-letter [https://perma.cc/JB26-P32W].
62. Id. PayPal, Stripe, eBay, Visa and Mastercard left the association in the last couple of months,
despite having originally joined the association. Hannah Murphy & Kiran Stacey, Mastercard, Visa,
eBay
and
Stripe
Quit
Facebook s
Libra,
FIN. TIMES
(Oct.
11,
2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/a3e952dc-ec5c-11e9-85f4-d00e5018f061 [https://perma.cc/D7FTEXS8].
63. See Emilios Avgouleas & Sir William Blair, The Concept of Money in the 4th Industrial
Revolution A Legal and Economic Analysis, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. (2020).
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tender;64 accordingly, only the Mint and the Federal Reserve can produce
coins and currency. Different jurisdictions take different views on the
legal nature of cryptocurrencies, sometimes treating them as money,
sometimes treating them as commodities.65 Others identify their nature by
focusing on their background technology.66
Various regulators around the world treat cryptocurrency as money.
According to Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) in the
United States, cryptocurrencies and other virtual currencies are mediums
of exchange that operate like a currency without having all the features of
real currency, above all the legal tender status; in particular, con ertible
virtual currencies have an equivalent value in real currency, or may act as
a substitute for real currency.67 Similar views are held elsewhere as well.
The German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesamt f r
Finanzdienstleistungen) took a similar approach as FinCen in a
communication on Bitcoins in December 2013. According to this
communication, Bitcoins are legally binding financial instruments in the
form of units of account that are similar to foreign currencies.68 Her
Majest s Re enue and Customs (HMRC) in the United Kingdom also
treats cryptocurrencies as money for tax purposes.69 In an important
decision concerning the nature of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies in
the E.U. legal order, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
both implicitly and explicitly recognizes cryptocurrencies also for tax,
namely value-added tax, purposes as some form of money.70
64. 31 U.S.C. § 5103.
65. See REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN, supra note 12; see also Noah Vardi, Bit by Bit: Assessing the
Legal Nature of Virtual Currencies, in BITCOIN AND MOBILE PAYMENTS: CONSTRUCTING A
EUROPEAN UNION FRAMEWORK 55 (Gabriella Gimigliano ed., 2016).
66. See infra section I.C.
67. DEP T OF TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF T NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF
FINCEN S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES (2013) [hereinafter FINCEN], https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN2013-G001.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6GT-38JP]. This definition brings cryptocurrencies very close to
actual money but does not really equate them. The U.S. anti-money laundering regime applies to any
alue that substitutes for currenc . Id. at 3; see 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (2019).
68. Jens Münzer, Bitcoins: Aufsichtliche Bewertung und Risiken für Nutzer, BAFIN (Dec. 19, 2013),
https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Fachartikel/2014/fa_bj_1401_bitcoins.h
tml [https://perma.cc/WSL3-3Y5G].
69. HER MAJESTY S REVENUE & CUSTOMS, REVENUE AND CUSTOMS BRIEF 9: BITCOIN AND
OTHER CRYPTOCURRENCIES (2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/revenue-andcustoms-brief-9-2014-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies [https://perma.cc/7NMR-R957].
70. Högsta förvaltningsrättens beslut [HFD] [Supreme Administrative Court Decision] 2015 case
no. C-264/14, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62014CJ0264
[https://perma.cc/ZSV3-Q6WM] (Swed.). The CJEU uses the terms traditional currenc for
national currencies such as the S edish cro n, and the term non-traditional currenc for
cryptocurrencies. According to the Court, non-traditional currencies are currencies other than those

Dimitropoulos_UPDATED Paginated_jci(Do Not Delete)

2020]

THE LAW OF BLOCKCHAIN

10/5/2020 3:54 PM

1135

Other jurisdictions and regulators follow a different approach in
identifying cryptocurrencies as commodities.71 In the United States, the
regulatory agency responsible for commodities regulation, the
Commodity Futures Trade Commission (CFTC), has classified
cryptocurrencies as commodities for the purposes of the Commodity
Exchange Act of 1936.72 The People s Bank of China (PBOC), together
ith four other regulators, has issued a Notice on Precautions Against
the Risks of Bitcoins, 73 denying that cryptocurrencies are money and
classified them as irtual commodities. 74
But cryptocurrencies, even when identified as money or commodities,
are more than just that. Some regulatory actors have opted to focus on the
underlying technology of cryptocurrencies. As will be highlighted later in
this Article,75 jurisdictions that focus on the underlying technology have
adopted a more favorable and enabling approach to cryptocurrencies on
the whole.
b.

Private Uses

In the private sector, blockchain technology is increasingly being used
to support smart contracts. 76 A smart contract is a self-executing
contract, hereb the terms of the agreement bet een the t o parties
are directly written into code, reducing transaction costs, and facilitating
transactions without third-party intervention.77 But, the name smart
that are legal tender in one or more countries, in so far as those currencies have been accepted by
the parties to a transaction as an alternative to legal tender and have no purpose other than to be a
means of pa ment. Id. ¶ 49. It moreover explicitly denies them the nature of a good. Finally, it
decided that the provisions of the E.U. VAT Directive applying to traditional money also find
application in the case of virtual currencies.
71. Bank of England economists have also identified virtual currencies as commodities. See Robleh
Ali et al., The Economics of Digital Currencies, 54 BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. 276, 278 (2014).
72. Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29 (Sept. 17, 2015),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcoinfli
prorder09172015.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSR6-J695].
73. Press Release, Ministry of Indus. & Info. Tech. of the People s Bank of China, The People s
Bank and Other Five Ministries Issued a Notice on Preventing Bitcoin Risks (Dec. 3, 2013)
[hereinafter People s Bank of China],
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1652930/n3757016/c3762245/content.html
[https://perma.cc/57DS-3TX7].
74. Id.
75. See infra section I.C.
76. The concept of the smart contract was developed in the mid-1990s. It was introduced and
developed by cryptographer Nick Szabo in various publications during the Nineties. See NICK SZABO,
SMART CONTRACTS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR DIGITAL MARKETS (rev. ed. 2018).
77. See generally Roger Brownsword, Regulatory Fitness: Fintech, Funny Money, and Smart
Contracts, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 5 (2019); THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SMART
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contracts is a misnomer: They are neither smart (there is no cognitive
component, simply automatic execution once a precondition is fulfilled),
nor a contract in a legal sense. 78 Blockchain technology allows smart
contracts to be layered on top of token exchanges, whereby exchanges
only occur if particular conditions are met.79 The contracts are then selfexecuting. A smart contract using blockchain is a way of making an
agreement that is fulfilled as soon as certain pre-determined conditions
are satisfied. A blockchain-based smart contract can be coded between
any party in the world, independent of their physical location. Smart
contracts and blockchain can thus support and semi-automatically enforce
legal contracts. According to some accounts, smart contracts are not only
intended to support or enforce actual contracts; they are actually meant to
replace them.80
Coding of legal and social arrangements on blockchain goes beyond
smart contracts and has led to the development of Decentralized
Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). A DAO is an organization
constituted by rules coded into a blockchain based on principles agreed to
by the stakeholders of the organization. Often, DAOs sell tokens online
that give rights to holders such as voting rights e.g., the right to vote on
proposals for projects the DAO ants to fund. A DAO is decentrali ed
because no centralized authority, person, or entity, controls it. It is
autonomous because it runs itself through a series of connected smart
contracts. Finall , it is an organi ation in the sense that it brings together
a set of resources that refer to each other.81 DAOs do not generally come
under the conventional understanding of organizations, and thus create
problems of legal categorization.82
CONTRACTS, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND DIGITAL PLATFORMS (Larry A. DiMatteo et al. eds.,
2019).
78. DELOITTE, BLOCKCHAIN: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS, QUESTIONS, OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS
(2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/legal/za_legal_implications_of_bloc
kchain_14052019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EHC-HNDN].
79. Smart contracts were first introduced in 2015 in blockchain technology by Ethereum, and are
being increasingly intertwined with blockchain technology. They have become a functionality of
blockchain, currently considered as one of its most promising features.
80. See De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 1.
81. See generally Carla L. Reyes et al., Distributed Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE
1 (2017).
82. Organizations are special institutions that involve (a) criteria to establish their boundaries and
to distinguish their members from nonmembers, (b) principles of sovereignty concerning who is in
charge, and (c) chains of command delineating responsibilities ithin the organi ation. Geoffre M.
Hodgson, What Are Institutions?, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 1 (2006). The precise legal status of DAOs is
currentl unclear in most jurisdictions. According to Usha Rodrigues, the are more of a irtual
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Another promising area of application of blockchain technology is
supply chain management and logistics and all related applications in
international business transactions. According to some accounts,
blockchain will disrupt business practices and models in the same way
that the Internet did in the field of communication.83 According to the
World Economic Forum, [r]educing suppl chain barriers to trade could
increase GDP b nearl 5% and trade b 15%. 84 Global supply chains
are very complex, involving diverse public and private bodies and
multiple interests and intermediaries across many jurisdictions.
Blockchain can cope with the complexity of global supply chains.85 It can
help connect the various parties outside of the jurisdiction in which they
are located, as well as independently of whether they are government or
private actors. All stakeholders can view and have online access to bills
of lading and other data-related documentation, including the status of
customs documents. Blockchain technology ensures data exchange in a
secure way and offers a repository of information which is tamper-proof
for multiple transactions across various private and public systems. New
applications such as Polkadot and Cosmos will further facilitate the use of
the blockchain for such purposes, as they permit interoperability among
permissioned and permissionless blockchains creating
metablockchains. 86
c.

Government Uses

The application of blockchain technology is fast transitioning from the
private to the public sector, as governments around the world do not want
to be left behind when it comes to the use of the technology. The public
sector is responsible for many areas of trust. Important public sector
applications are: identity management and attestation; the keeping of
government records, such as land registration and corporate registration
records; citizen services management in areas such as healthcare; and the
enture capital fund than a corporation. See Rodrigues, supra note 25, at 680.
83. DHL TREND RSCH., BLOCKCHAIN IN LOGISTICS 4 (2018),
https://www.logistics.dhl/content/dam/dhl/global/core/documents/pdf/glo-core-blockchain-trendreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG7G-UCW4].
84. WORLD ECON. F., BAIN & CO., & WORLD BANK, ENABLING TRADE: VALUING GROWTH
OPPORTUNITIES (2013),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_SCT_EnablingTrade_Report_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/47QB-Y4XW].
85. See generally DHL TREND RSCH., supra note 83.
86. Christine Kim, A Blockchain to Connect All Blockchains, Cosmos Is Officially Live, COINDESK
(Mar. 13, 2019, 11:10 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/a-blockchain-to-connect-all-blockchainscosmos-is-now-officially-live [https://perma.cc/DN25-9QJ]; see also infra section III.C.3.
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conduct of government activities, such as voting, taxation, customs, and
public procurement.87 This type of trust may now be secured by
blockchain. Many government-related services could thus be provided
without direct involvement of government at least in the way that
government is involved today. As the Economist magazine put it a few
years ago, the use of blockchain by the government means that an antiestablishment technolog faces an ironic turn of fortune. 88 Some
governments are more reluctant to relinquish their traditional trustmediating role, while others are more open to the idea. In the United
States, while the federal government has been more risk-averse regarding
the facilitation and adoption of blockchain technology, state governments
seem to be more open to using the technology.89
Some countries use blockchain as part of a broader approach to public
service delivery. Estonia was among the first countries to develop a vision
for an electronic state through its E-Estonia initiative.90 This coincided
87. See Jorden Woods, Blockchain: Public Sector Use Cases, MEDIUM: CRYPTOORACLE (Oct. 2,
2018), https://medium.com/crypto-oracle/blockchain-public-sector-use-cases-49a2d74ad946
[https://perma.cc/5T8N-XXCF]. In the United States, Illinois, for example, has shown a particular
interest in the areas of identity, attestation, and ownership registries, compliance and reporting
ledgers, benefit and entitlement ledgers, and a set of new products and services including escrow as a
service, governmental distributed ledgers, and securing the Internet of Things infrastructure. See
CRAIG HOLLOWAY, DEP T OF INNOVATION & TECH., STATE OF ILLINOIS: REQUEST FOR
INFORMATION (RFI): DISTRIBUTED LEDGER AND BLOCKCHAIN APPLICATIONS IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 5 6 (2016),
https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/doit/Documents/BlockchainInitiative/RFI+Blockchain+and+Distribu
ted+Ledger+Applications+in+the+Public+Sector.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7G3-T4AB].
Identity management and attestation is an area that has seen a widespread use of blockchain. Legal
documents often require notarization of signatures attesting to the identity of the signer. More than
1.1 billion individuals do not have any official identity documents at all. See Press Release, The World
Bank, 1.1 Billion Invisible People Without ID Are Priority for New High Level Advisory Council
on Identification for Development (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2017/10/12/11-billion-invisible-people-without-id-are-priority-for-new-high-level-advisorycouncil-on-identification-for-development [https://perma.cc/P5LQ-NUDX]. Many public and private
institutions have been trying to remedy this. For example, the Digital Identity Alliance, or ID2020
Alliance, an organization affiliated with the United Nations, seeks to provide proof of identity to
people without an official form of identification. Blockchain has been used to create secure digital
identities and as a proof of identity. The ID2020 Alliance is an initiative of governments, NGOs, and
the private sector to provide a blockchain-based framework for digital identity that will be personal,
persistent, portable, and private. Private companies involved in the ID2020 Alliance are Microsoft
and Accenture. The ID2020 Alliance is expected to assist millions of refugees all over the world over
the next few years. See SCI. FORESIGHT UNIT, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RSCH. SERV., TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION FOR HUMANITARIAN AID AND ASSISTANCE 57 58 (2019).
88. Governments May Be Big Backers of the Blockchain, ECONOMIST (June 1, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21722869-anti-establishment-technology-faces-ironicturn-fortune-governments-may-be-big-backers [https://perma.cc/6XAY-NFQG].
89. See infra section I.C.
90. See We Have Built a Digital Society and We Can Show You How, E-ESTONIA, https://e-

Dimitropoulos_UPDATED Paginated_jci(Do Not Delete)

2020]

THE LAW OF BLOCKCHAIN

10/5/2020 3:54 PM

1139

with the popularization of blockchain technology, and the Estonian
government has been testing the technology since 2008.91 As of 2012,
blockchain has been in operational use in Estonia s registries and for a
majority of government services such as national health, judicial,
legislative, security, and commercial code systems.92 There are plans to
extend its use to other spheres such as personal medicine, cybersecurity,
and data embassies. For example, filing tax returns and buying a car can
be done online in Estonia using blockchain for purposes of information
accuracy.93 The vision in Estonia even goes beyond public service
delivery.94
In a similar vein, Dubai wants blockchain technology to power its
entire go ernment, making Dubai the first cit full po ered b
Blockchain. 95 The plan is to move all government documents to
blockchain by 2020, and have 50% of its services operating on a
blockchain platform by 2021.96 The government of the Emirate has
moreover announced that it will introduce its own blockchain-based
currency, called emCash, to facilitate transactions in the public and
private sectors in the country.97
Governments are using blockchain in increasingly varied ways: for
estonia.com/ [https://perma.cc/3BP8-L5PG].
91. See Frequently Asked Questions: Estonian Blockchain Technology, E-ESTONIA, https://eestonia.com/wp-content/uploads/2019aug-nochanges-faq-a4-v03-blockchain-1-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/56B2-PPYV].
92. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ESTONIA THE DIGITAL REPUBLIC SECURED BY
BLOCKCHAIN (2019), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/legal/tech/assets/estonia-the-digitalrepublic-secured-by-blockchain.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VJF-DT7H].
93. See Clare Linda Sullivan & Eric W. Burger, E-Residency and Blockchain (Apr. 2, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757492
[https://perma.cc/8KVV-JMMW] (regarding Estonia s blockchain-based e-residency program and
foreign citizens wanting to do business in or though Estonia).
94. According to former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Estonia is no a blockchain
nation. See Kaspar Korjus, Welcome to the Blockchain Nation, MEDIUM (July 7, 2017),
https://medium.com/e-residency-blog/welcome-to-the-blockchain-nation-5d9b46c06fd4
[https://perma.cc/M7UN-GZ6L].
95. See Blockchain, SMART DUBAI, https://www.smartdubai.ae/initiatives/blockchain
[https://perma.cc/C8HX-6CCF].
96. Emirates Blockchain Strategy 2021, U.A.E., https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/strategiesinitiatives-and-awards/federal-governments-strategies-and-plans/emirates-blockchain-strategy-2021
[https://perma.cc/7CNB-SU8U]. Dubai has developed the umbrella initiative of Smart Dubai that
includes such other initiatives as Startup Support, the Happiness Agenda, the AI Lab, as well as the
Dubai Blockchain Strategy. It has moreover established the Global Blockchain Council founded by
the Dubai Future Foundation.
97. Samburaj Das, emCash Is Dubai s First Official State Cryptocurrency, CRYPTOCOINSNEWS
(Oct. 3, 2017, 1:57 PM), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/emcash-dubais-first-official-statecryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/JNC3-VENA].
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registering land titles,98 managing health data,99 and promoting other
technologies.100 The use of blockchain technology has moved to the
international level as well. In August 2018, the World Bank and
CommBank from Australia launched bond-i, a blockchain-based debt
instrument for bond issuance and bond lifecycle management.101
The most important government use of blockchain is by central
banks.102 It has even been suggested that cryptocurrencies may one day
replace sovereign currencies.103 Central banks all over the world have
been working on the development of Retail Central Bank Digital Currency
(CBDC).
CBDCs are not cryptocurrencies; they are rather digital blockchainbased fiat currencies, a digital form of blockchain-powered fiat money
i.e., money based not on the value of the commodity that backs it and
physically represents it, but rather by trust in government and central
98. Georgia has moreover become the first country to register land titles using blockchain
technology. See Frisco D Anconia, Georgia Becomes First Country to Register Property on
Blockchain, COINTELEGRAPH (Feb. 8, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/georgia-becomes-firstcountry-to-register-property-on-blockchain [https://perma.cc/CG78-G9LW].
99. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has shown an interest in using blockchain
to manage health data. See Joseph Bradley, U.S. Department of Health Calls for Blockchain Research,
CRYPTOCOINSNEWS (July 8, 2016), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/u-s-department-of-healthcalls-for-blockchain-white-papers [https://perma.unl.edu/JQ2J-J7B9].
100. Malta is a very interesting example of a country embracing blockchain technology; in 2018
the government put in place three legislative instruments for the promotion of new technologies, with
an emphasis on blockchain. See Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act, 2018 (Law
43) (Malta); Virtual Financial Assets Act, 2018 (Law 44) (Malta); Malta Digital Innovation Authority
Act, 2018 (Law 45) (Malta).
101. See Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Issues Second Tranche of Blockchain Bond
Via Bond-i (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/08/16/worldbank-issues-second-tranche-of-blockchain-bond-via-bond-I [https://perma.cc/DK55-7DN8].
102. Many more possible central bank uses may be identified, apart from the ones mentioned in
the body of the text, for example, interbank securities settlement, focused application of blockchainbased digital currency, including CBDC, enabling the rapid interbank clearing and settlement of
securities for cash; central banks are moreover exploring use of blockchain technologies for purposes
of payment system resiliency and contingency, including cases of technical or network failure, natural
disasters and cyberattacks. See Ashley Lannquist, 10 Ways Central Banks Are Experimenting with
Blockchain, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/blockchaindistrubuted-ledger-technology-central-banks-10-ways-research/ [https://perma.cc/X3NF-V5RC] (on
this as well as on the central bank uses mentioned in the text). Project Ubin, for example, is a project
developed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore with the industry to explore the use of Blockchain
and Distributed Ledger Technology for clearing and settlement of payments and securities. See
Project Ubin: Central Bank Digital Money Using Distributed Ledger Technology, MONETARY AUTH.
OF SING., https://www.mas.gov.sg/schemes-and-initiatives/Project-Ubin [https://perma.cc/5Z3WSMYQ].
103. See Adam James, Will Cryptocurrency Replace National Currencies by 2030?, BITCOINIST
(Mar. 2, 2018, 8:00 PM), https://bitcoinist.com/will-cryptocurrency-replace-national-currencies-by2030/ [https://perma.cc/SPR3-77UW].
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banks with legal tender status. Central bank-issued digital currency
operates in a peer-to-peer and decentralized manner. It may be made
available for consumer use, and could be used to complement or substitute
for physical money and serve as an alternative to traditional bank deposits.
Another use central banks have been experimenting with is wholesale
CBDC, namely central bank-issued digital currency that operates in a
peer-to-peer and decentralized manner but is only available to commercial
banks and clearing houses for use in the wholesale inter-bank market. The
People s Bank of China (PBOC) has been de eloping the digital uan
ith the goal of impro ing the PBOC s abilit to track mone
electronically as it changes hands, helping thus to combat money
laundering and other illegal acti ities. Other e amples include Urugua s
pilot program on the e-Peso,
hich is supported b the International
Monetar Fund. Vene uela has de eloped the Petro, and S eden s
Riksbank has long been e ploring an e-krona. 104
B.

Code, Law, and the Lex Cryptographia

Professor Lawrence Lessig has famously explained how code can
operate as law.105 According to Lessig, there are four main ways through
which individual behavior is constrained and regulated: the law, social
norms, market forces, and architecture.106 These forces shape indi iduals
actions in various ways. The law creates constraints on individuals by
putting limits on actions through legislation and regulation, and punishing
individuals that violate the rules. Social norms regulate cultural behaviors
through social mechanisms such as peer pressure. The market incentivizes
or disincentivizes certain behaviors through the mechanism of supply and
demand. Architecture of the natural or the artificial environment
imposes a series of limits on the type of actions that an individual can do.
Code is the man-made architecture of cyberspace and can thus regulate
individual behavior via means of technology. It thus imposes systematic
constraints on individual behavior in an artificial environment. The
designer of code is the rulemaker of the technological en ironment.107
For example, the designer of the Internet regulates behavior on the
Internet; the designer of digital platforms regulates behavior on digital
platforms.108
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See supra section I.A.2.a.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 123 (2006).
But see Tim Wu, When Code Isn t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679 (2003).
An important difference bet een the ph sical and digital orld is that, e en though a single
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According to some recent accounts, the lines of influence between law
and code run in both directions. While code takes the form of law in the
sense of the regulatory power that the code exercises in certain
environments, such as the Internet the law may be gradually turning into
code: in the last fe ears (especiall since the emergence of blockchain
technology and corresponding smart contract transactions) the law is
progressi el starting to assume the characteristics of code. 109
Blockchain technolog is a prime e ample of code as la . This is
due to its distinct technological characteristics such as malleability:
Blockchain technology reinforces the tendency to rely on code
(rather than on the law) to regulate individual actions and
transactions. The blockchain enables a whole new type of
regulation by code, which
combined with smart contracts
also promotes a new way of thinking about the law. Indeed, as
more and more contractual rules and legal provisions are
incorporated into smart contract code, the traditional conception
of the law (as a flexible and inherently ambiguous set of rules)
might need evolve into something that can better be assimilated
into code. As a result of this tendency, both lawyers and
legislators could increasingly be tempted to deliberately draft
legal or contractual rules in a way that is much closer to the way
technical rules are drafted. Code is Law might therefore lead to
law progressively turning into code.110
Blockchain, with its multiple uses and functionalities, and the lex
cryptographia of blockchain present a new paradigm for law. It may affect
individual rules, the legal system, and above all how lawmakers,
regulators, individuals, and society at large think about the law. Removing
the uncertainty and narrowing law down to technical codes may have an
impact on how the law is interpreted, applied and enforced by the
executive branch and above all the courts. By removing the ambiguity
inherent in the law, it may in fact make legal interpretation and
enforcement through the executive and the judicative branches of
government increasingly redundant.
The nature of blockchain technology makes regulation through its code
very powerful. The tamper-proof nature of the ledger, as well as its
potential for automating transactions makes lex cryptographia a very
individual cannot influence forces like Law, Social Norms, Markets and Nature, individuals are
increasingl able to create and manipulate code (either b themsel es, or b getting others to do it).
De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 1.
109. Id.
110. De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 1 (emphasis in original).
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efficient regulatory code.111 At the same time, lex cryptographia is subject
to e ternal regulation coming from the ordinar la of the real orld.
Most likely, the relationship between the two will not be one of
substitution, but rather of complementarity, as this Article discusses in the
next section.112
C.

The Response of the Law of the Physical World: From Indifference
to Recognition to Control to Adoption

It took many years before governments started reacting to the rise of
cryptocurrencies, and even longer regarding their reaction to blockchain
technology. The phase of indifference gave way in some countries to a
phase of recognition. This section discusses the phase of control that
followed the recognition phase, including various measures that
governments implemented to exercise that control. Some countries have
taken a different step by explicitly adopting the technology not only for
the purposes of private transactions, but also for the purposes of
transactions in the public sector.
Overall, there is a discrepancy as to how different countries around the
word deal particularly with cryptoassets. A comparative look at
cryptoasset regulation even reveals a paradoxical regulatory landscape.
On the one side, some jurisdictions try to restrict their use reaching from
complete bans on the use of cryptoassets to restrictions on use to more
spot on restrictions. On the other side, some governments have been trying
to enable the operations of FinTech companies, including cryptocurrency
startups, in their jurisdictions by using innovative regulatory instruments,
such as inno ation hubs, and regulator sandbo es. 113 Looser
regulatory standards apply to them than to conventional financial
institutions.
111. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 13.
112. See FINCK, supra note 1, at 85.
113. Regulatory sandboxes allow businesses to test new products, services, business models, and
delivery mechanisms in a more relaxed regulatory environment. As the UK Financial Conduct
Authorit defines it, a regulator sandbo is a safe space in hich businesses can test inno ati e
products, services, business models and delivery mechanisms without immediately incurring all the
normal regulatory consequences of engaging in the activity in question. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.,
REGULATORY SANDBOX 1 (2015), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatorysandbox.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RMM-5U34]. The idea is to provide FinTech and startup companies
with more pathways to start testing the viability of innovative financial services before being subject
to the regulations and regulatory costs associated with the development of standard financial products.
The underlying rationale is to strike a balance between facilitating innovation and competition, while
at the same time ensuring consumer protection and the distribution of the benefits of innovative
FinTech products to society at large.
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There are different established practices and needs for the regulation of
something depending on whether it is characterized as money,
commodity, or technology. In a continuum of regulatory approaches,
regulation of money will have the tendency to be heavier, regulation of a
commodity will have the tendency to be lighter, while regulation of a
technology will have the tendency to be not restricting, but rather enabling
of the technology, as well as the private companies that develop the
technology.114 Even when blockchain technology is identified as a
technology for regulatory purposes, different types of regulation will kick
in. This is particularly the case with regard to privacy and data protection
regulation. This section presents the response of legal orders to the rise of
blockchain technology, including the rise of cryptoassets. Overall, a
careful observation of the developments discussed in this and the previous
section show a clear transition of the approaches by regulators from
indifference, to recognition to control to eventually adoption by some of
them.
During the first few years of the existence of cryptocurrencies,
governments did not pay particular attention to the phenomenon. The lack
of regulation or enforcement meant that intermediaries were left to selfregulation through terms of use and policies.115 The indifference approach
played out in very interesting ways when it comes to the relationship
between blockchain and data protection laws. The situation in the
European Union may be worth expanding on. Data protection has been
elevated to the status of a fundamental right in the European Union, as
well as elsewhere in the world.116 Moreover, the CJEU has famously
adopted a broad interpretation of data protection.117 Data protection laws
may thus be applicable in the case of blockchain.118 The General Data
114. See also infra sections III.C.1, III.C.2.
115. Lam Pak Nian & David Lee Kuo Chuen, A Light Touch of Regulation for Virtual Currencies,
in HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, INNOVATION, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG
DATA 309, 315 (David Lee Kuo Chuen ed., 2015).
116. The protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data is inscribed in
article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364), as well
as article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 2013 O.J. (C 326).
117. In the Breyer case, the relevant data protection-related legislation has found application in
cases of dynamic IP addresses. At the same time, the Court has acknowledged that storage of online
data (by the German authorities) might be necessary for protection from cyberattacks. See BGH, Oct.
19, 2016, C-582/14, juris (Ger.) http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-582/14 (last
visited Sept. 20, 2020).
118. See generally FINCK, supra note 1; Michèle Finck, Blockchains and Data Protection in the
European Union, 4 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 17 (2018); Primavera De Filippi, The Interplay between
Decentralization and Privacy: The Case of Blockchain Technologies, J. OF PEER PROD., Sept. 2016,
http://peerproduction.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/blockchain-technologies-draft.pdf
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Protection Regulation (GDPR), which has applied in the European Union
since May 25, 2018 has a very broad scope of application, and also applies
extraterritorially.119 There is a potential conflict between blockchain
technolog and the GDPR hen it comes to t o of blockchain s most
important features: the technical rule that information on blockchain is
visible to every node;120 second, the non-removable nature of information
on blockchain a subsequent transaction can always reverse the first
transaction, but the first transaction will remain in the chain. These
features of the technology may be viewed as violating important
principles of the GDPR such as data minimization,121 the principle of
accuracy and the right to rectification,122 the principle of storage
limitation,123 the right of data subjects to withdraw consent to data
processing,124 and the right of access,125 as well as last but not least, the
right to erasure or right to be forgotten of data subjects.126 The major
issue here is whether there is consent by the users for the processing of
their data.127 Moreo er, there are no clearl identifiable data controllers
and data processors in the blockchain en ironment that could be
requested to comply with the GDPR.128
Despite the development of blockchain technology since 2008,
legislators and regulators in the European Union were slow to adapt to the
technological advances brought about by blockchain. The general concept
of blockchain and DLT is to move beyond the idea of centralized
management of ledgers and information. In addition, nodes are
decentralized entities that cannot respond to the tasks the GDPR requires
of centralized agents. Overall, digital decentralization offers a completely
[https://perma.cc/J9RS-Q55M].
119. See 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32 33 [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation]. The Member
States of the European Union have also developed national data protection laws and have in place
independent agencies for the management of data protection laws, such as the Commission nationale
de l informatique et des libertés (CNIL).
120. According to an Opinion of the article 29 Working Party, encrypted data will often qualify as
personal data, and not as anonymous data, see Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 5/2014
on Anonymization Techniques, at 20, Doc. 0829/14/EN WP216 (2014), the threshold for
anon mi ation under the Regulation is er high and onl results from processing personal data in
order to irreversibly prevent identification, id.
121. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 119, at 35.
122. Id. at 43.
123. Id. at 36.
124. Id. at 37.
125. Id. at 43.
126. Id. at 41, 43 44.
127. See id. at 34, 36.
128. See id. at 33; see also id. at 47 (on the definition of controller and processor ).
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different paradigm of data management, which could promote data
protection,129 and could thus be interpreted to fall outside the scope of the
GDPR. This analysis becomes even more pertinent if one considers the
extraterritorial application of the GDPR, as well as the adoption of similar
legislative approaches to data protection such as the California Consumer
Privacy Act.130
The phase of indifference gave way in some countries to a phase of
recognition. Recognition did not necessarily translate to any distinct
regulatory response. In the United States, some agencies opted not to
intervene, while other chose to do so. Janet Yellen, the former Chair of
the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, noted at a
Senate Banking Committee hearing that [i]t s important to understand
that [the Bitcoin] is a pa ment inno ation that s happening outside the
banking industr and that [t]he Federal Reser e simpl does not ha e
the authorit to regulate bitcoin in an a . 131 Other jurisdictions, such
as the United Kingdom, have recognized the existence of cryptoassets and
blockchain technology in their jurisdictions, but deliberately made a
decision not to intervene at least restrictively in the development of
blockchain and cryptocurrencies.132
By contrast, many countries around the world have developed legal
frameworks for the regulation of cryptocurrencies. These countries have
realized the potentially disruptive nature of cryptocurrencies functioning
as currencies and have mainly pursued two approaches in their regulation:
command and control, and various intermediate interventions.
China has been the main example of a jurisdiction attempting a major
ban on the use of cryptocurrencies. The PBOC issued jointly with four
other go ernment agencies the Notice on Precautions Against the Risks
of Bitcoins disallo ing banks and other financial and pa ment
institutions from using and trading in Bitcoin.133 This is not a direct

129. Guy Zyskind et al., Decentralizing Privacy: Using Blockchain to Protect Personal Data, 2015
IEEE CS SEC. & PRIV. WORKSHOPS 180, 180 84, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7163223
[https://perma.cc/Y8G2-E56E].
130. See generally Lydia F. de la Torre, A Guide to the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
(Nov. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3275571 [https://perma.cc/NRX9-ZG9B].
131. See Janet Yellen: Fed Will Steer Clear of Bitcoin, FORTUNE (Feb. 28, 2014, 2:27 PM),
http://fortune.com/2014/02/27/janet-yellen-fed-will-steer-clear-of-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/HF4M62EY].
132. Cf., e.g., 18 Dec. 2013, HL Deb (2013) col. 202 (UK), http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/131218w0001.htm [https://perma.cc/T52C-Z4KG] (the
Commercial Secretary to the Treasury stating that Bitcoin remained unregulated in the UK).
133. People s Bank of China, supra note 73.
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prohibition of Bitcoin in China as Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies can
still be used. Nevertheless, the Notice restricts most of the money-like
functions of Bitcoin since Chinese banks and payment institutions are
prohibited from dealing in Bitcoins. Moreover, in 2017, a committee led
by the PBOC imposed a ban on ICOs.134
Other countries have adopted softer approaches to the regulation of
cryptocurrencies. There are three main intermediate responses, all
pioneered by U.S. agencies. First, cryptocurrencies have been subjected
to related neighboring regulator regimes and disciplines. For e ample,
one of the first measures adopted in the United States with regard to
cryptocurrencies was the imposition of an anti-money laundering
regime.135 Likewise, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
successfully placed cryptocurrencies under its regulatory ambit by
imposing sanctions on unauthorized traders operating securities online for
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Litecoin.136 The SEC s Strategic Hub
134. See Kenneth Rapoza, China s Bitcoin Ban No Match for Stateless Cryptocurrency Market,
FORBES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/10/18/chinas-blockchainbitcoin-ban-no-match-for-stateless-cryptocurrency-market/#2032415e2de6 [https://perma.cc/F5H58QG5].
135. In 2013, FinCEN issued a Guidance specifying that decentralized i.e., based on public
permissionless blockchains virtual currencies should comply with money laundering regulations.
See FINCEN, supra note 67. While a user of virtual currency is not a Money Services Business (MSB)
under FinCEN s regulations and therefore not subject to MSB registration, reporting, and
recordkeeping regulations, an administrator or exchanger of virtual currency is regarded as an MSB
and should generally be considered as a money transmitter. At the same time, an administrator or
exchanger is neither a provider or seller of prepaid access nor a dealer in foreign exchange, under the
regulations of FinCEN.
136. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & E ch. Comm n, SEC Sanctions Operator of Bitcoin-Related
Stock Exchange for Registration Violations (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-273 [https://perma.cc/4SEA-YN9V]. According to the SEC, investments in cryptoassets
may be considered as securities for the purposes of U.S. securities laws. See Final Judgment Entered
Against Trendon T. Shavers, a/k/a Piratreat40 Operator of Bitcoin Ponzi Scheme Ordered to Pay
More Than $40 Million in Disgorgement and Penalties, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM N (Sept. 22, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2014/lr23090.htm [https://perma.cc/46EA-NYGB]; cf. also
Ruoke Yang, When Is Bitcoin a Security Under U.S. Securities Law?, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL Y 99
(2013). In a 2013 judgment, the U.S. District Court followed the interpretation of the SEC. See SEC
v. Shavers & Bitcoin Sav. & Trust, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
The same approach has been adopted by the SEC with regard to ICOs. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM N, RELEASE NO. 81207, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (2017); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM N,
Investor
Bulletin:
Initial
Coin
Offerings,
INVESTOR.GOV
(July
25,
2017),
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-initialcoin-offerings [https://perma.cc/723K-FGJ5]. SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has differentiated between
the regulation of cryptoassets as a means of exchange, securities, or commodities. See Public
Statement, Jay Clayton, Chairman U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm n, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and
Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statementclayton-2017-12-11 [https://perma.cc/U5GY-L7LL]. The SEC issued a report in 2017 labeling the
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for Innovation and Financial Technology (FinHub) has published a
framework for analyzing whether a digital asset is a security.137 Second,
domestic regulators, including the SEC and the European Banking
Authority (EBA), have been issuing warnings regarding cryptoassets.138
Third, many countries have introduced various taxation schemes for
cryptocurrencies.139 For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
issued a Notice clarifying that while virtual currencies are used by
consumers in the same way as legal tender, the disposition of Bitcoin is,
unlike cash, a taxable transaction to the consumer.140
2016 DAO tokens securities under the Howey test, i.e., a common enterprise ith profits deri ed
solel from the efforts of others. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). If the tokens are
securities, then the DAO s organizers may be violating U.S. securities laws by conducting a public
offering without registering with the SEC or qualifying for an exemption from registration. Because
the 2016 DAO was unwound, the SEC did not prosecute the 2016 DAO organizers, but the SEC has
engaged in subsequent enforcement actions. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & E ch. Comm n, SEC
Exposes Two Initial Coin Offerings Purportedly Backed by Real Estate and Diamonds (Sept. 29,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-185-0 [https://perma.cc/2RAP-NDDT];
Complaint, SEC v. PlexCorps, No. 1:17-cv-07007-CBA-RML (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2017), ECF No. 1,
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2017/comp-pr2017-219.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RAPNDDT]; Munchee, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445, (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S5V-W7LY].
137. See Framework for Investment Contract Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM N (Apr. 3 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysisdigital-assets [https://perma.cc/4HA3-7BYK]; see also Public Statement, Bill Hinman, Dir. of Div.
of Corp. Fin., & Valerie Szczepanik, Senior Advisor for Digit. Assets & Innovation, Statement on
Framework for Investment Contract Analysis of Digital Assets (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-framework-investment-contract-analysisdigital-assets [https://perma.cc/PH93-RNCP].
138. The SEC was also among the first to be involved in cryptoasset regulation in the form of
warnings, having issued a statement warning investors about the dangers of investing in Bitcoin. See
Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM N
(May 7, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/investoralertsia_bitcoin.html
[https://perma.cc/5W7U-GLH5]. The European Banking Authority (EBA) also issued a warning in
2013 regarding cryptocurrencies raising the issues of monetary loss due to fraud, price instability,
theft, and users inexperience that makes consumers unable to adequately assess the risk of purchasing
and using cryptocurrencies. See EBA Warns Consumers on Virtual Currencies, EUR. BANKING AUTH.
(Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-warns-consumers-on-virtual-currencies
[https://perma.cc/N28A-YSWZ]. Many agencies in EU Member States have followed the lead of the
EBA and have issued similar warnings. See, e.g., Les dangers liés au développement des monnaies
virtuelles: l exemple du bitcoin, BANQUE DE FRANCE: FOCUS, Dec. 5, 2013,
https://publications.banque-france.fr/les-dangers-lies-au-developpement-des-monnaies-virtuelleslexemple-du-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/U4F6-3NEQ] (following the lead of the EBA and issuing a
circular on the dangers associated with cryptocurrencies).
139. See generally Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38 (2013).
140. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, I.R.B. 2014-16 (2014). According to the IRS Notice, cryptocurrency
is propert in the hands of a ta pa er, hich means that its disposition is a ta able e ent to the
e tent that the cr ptocurrenc s value has changed since its acquisition by the taxpayer. See id. at 2.
As no traditional intermediaries are involved in the transactions, the collection of such tax will only
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In a very interesting move, the New York State Department of
Financial Services has imposed separate licensing requirements on
intermediary service providers of cryptocurrencies. The BitLicense
framework creates a very comprehensive licensing regime for a very wide
range of virtual currency intermediaries, including exchanges, wallets,
dealers and administrators.141 The new rules require registration and
licensing for certain cryptocurrency service providers. In the United
States, the Uniform Law Commission developed a model law called
Regulation of Virtual Currenc Business Act for the regulation of
virtual currencies, which is to some extent similar to the one that has
already been adopted in New York.142
Other countries have focused on the benefits of blockchain technology
in developing new cryptoasset applications and have adopted more
favorable approaches to cryptocurrencies. The government may enable
the adoption of cryptoassets and other blockchain applications in the
private sector,143 or even adopt blockchain for the provision of
government services. Increasingly, countries around the world have
started adopting policies directed towards the promotion of FinTech
startups, prominently also including startups working towards the
development of blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies. FinTech
promotion policies involve predominantly two regulatory measures:
launching innovation hubs to help FinTech startups comply with the
relevant laws and regulations, and establishing regulatory sandboxes for
new financial service participants,144 including the lowering of licensing
barriers reaching sometimes all the way to FinTech licensing
be possible if the taxpayers voluntarily report transactions. See IRS Reminds Taxpayers to Report
Virtual Currency Transactions, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-reminds-taxpayers-to-report-virtual-currency-transactions
[https://perma.cc/7UYN-TT7E]. The IRS has reached a very high level of sophistication regarding
taxing cryptoassets. In 2019, it issued guidance on issues of income tax in case of hard forks and
airdrops. See Rev. Rul. 2019-24, 2019-14 I.R.B. 932.
141. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200 (2020).
142. UNIFORM REGULATION OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY BUSINESSES ACT (NAT L CONF. OF
COMM RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2017),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKe
y=ef45a10b-ac62-ad3d-2f42-588d7eac3e40 [https://perma.cc/UTZ8-CQB2]; see also TIMOTHY G.
MASSAD, ECON. STUD. AT BROOKINGS, IT S TIME TO STRENGTHEN THE REGULATION OF CRYPTOASSETS 36 (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Timothy-Massad-ItsTime-to-Strengthen-the-Regulation-of-Crypto-Assets.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8XP-VFCU].
143. See REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN, supra note 12.
144. See generally Herbert Smith Freehills, Overview of Regulatory Sandbox Regimes in Australia,
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and the UK, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Dec. 18, 2016),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2016/12/overview-regulatory-sandbox-regimesaustralia-hong-kong-malaysia [https://perma.cc/UEH7-8RWR].
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exemptions.
Additionally, and as discussed in the previous section, governments
have been utilizing blockchain, including at the state level in the United
States. Arizona has passed a variety of measures along these lines, making
signatures, records, and contracts secured through blockchain technology
legall alid: [a] contract relating to a transaction ma not be denied legal
effect, validity or enforceability solely because that contract contains a
smart contract term. 145 Another Arizona law forbids any county from
prohibiting indi iduals from running a node on blockchain technolog in
a residence. 146 It is also unlawful to require people to use or be subject to
electronic firearm tracking technology including distributed ledger or
blockchain technology.147
Other U.S. states are following similar policies. In Washington State a
law has been adopted to support digital signature verification with the use
of distributed ledger technology.148 The State of New York has established
a taskforce with the aim of studying the potential assignment of economic
empowerment zones for the mining of cryptocurrencies.149 A draft bill has
been proposed in the State of Hawaii proposing to make it legal for banks
in Ha aii to store digital assets, a class that includes irtual currencies,
digital securities, and open blockchain tokens. 150 Cook County,
Illinois, is trying to move towards a blockchain-based system for the
transfer of real property.151 Delaware is in the process of allowing
corporations to issue shares on blockchain.152

145. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061 (2020); H.B. 2417, 53d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017).
146. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-269.22 (2020).
147. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3122 (2020); H.B. 2216, 53d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017).
148. Substitute S.B. 5638, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019). Recognizing the validity of
distributed ledger technology Washington State has also taken a series of actions in the direction of
recognizing cryptocurrencies. See Bitcoin and Virtual Currency Regulation, WASH. STATE DEP T OF
FIN. INSTS., https://dfi.wa.gov/bitcoin [https://perma.cc/NK8Y-NJMX].
149. Assemb. Bill A09862, 2018 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018).
150. See Nick Chong, Hawaiian Banks May Soon Dabble in Crypto: Lawmakers File Friendly Bill,
BLOCKONOMI (Jan. 27, 2020), https://blockonomi.com/hawaiian-banks-dabble-in-crypto/
[https://perma.cc/8LHP-9GNL].
151. JOHN MIRKOVIC, BLOCKCHAIN PILOT PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT (2017),
http://cookrecorder.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Final-Report-CCRD-Blockchain-PilotProgram-for-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3957-RPYP].
152. Pete Rizzo, Delaware Governor Signs Blockchain Bill into Law, COINDESK (July 24, 2017),
https://www.coindesk.com/delaware-governor-signs-blockchain-legislation-law
[https://perma.cc/9Y6Q-K5BH].
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BLOCKCHAIN AS INFRASTRUCTURE

What e might call the lex cryptographia of blockchain uniquely
combines t o of Lessig s regulator modalities of individual behavior:
the market and code. This combination is very powerful, since it makes
the application of some intrinsic market principles and values automatic
(codified) among regulatees.153 Moreover, it makes them global, as
blockchain is by nature a transnational technology.
The first section of this Part explains the background understanding of
blockchain technology: that it is powered by rational choice economics.
The argument then proceeds to discuss the extent to which blockchain
delivers on its promise to create a world without borders. The final section
of this Part moves on to explain that blockchain technology is even more
than a rational choice-backed mechanism. It is an infrastructure for the
operation of multiple activities from information storage to trade to
finance on a global scale. The identification of blockchain as an
infrastructure has certain legal consequences that are further identified.
A.

(Global) Law and Cryptoeconomics

1.

From Cryptoeconomics to Law and Cryptoeconomics

Blockchain is, according to some commentators, even more than a
technological development: it is a social technology for coordination of
individuals.154 In order to address coordination issues within the
blockchain environment, developers have turned to economic theory.
Applications of microeconomic theory to blockchain are still in their early
stages but are already existent in the various governance protocols of
blockchains.155
A new field of cryptoeconomics is developing and can be defined in
several ways. One way to understand cryptoeconomics is as the
economics of cryptoassets namely, how they are spent and the
economies surrounding them. Alternatively, while the term
cryptoeconomics is usually reserved for the structure of the incentives

153. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 511 (1999) (on the interplay of Lessig s modes of regulation); see also Paolo
Tasca & Riccardo Piselli, The Blockchain Paradox, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 27 (Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019) (applying Lessig s analysis to the
blockchain).
154. Davidson et al., Economics of Blockchain, supra note 28.
155. Marc Pilkington, Blockchain Technology: Principles and Applications, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL TRANSFORMATIONS 225 (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016).
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within the cryptoenvironment, Vlad Zamfir proposes a new discipline of
cr ptoeconomics as the economics of cr ptograph .156 According to his
definition, cr ptoeconomics is a formal discipline that studies protocols
that govern the production, distribution and consumption of goods and
ser ices in a decentrali ed digital econom and a practical science that
focuses on the design and characteri ation of these protocols. 157
According to Ethereum s co-founder Vitalik Buterin, the notion
cr ptoeconomic refers to any decentralized cryptographic protocol
that uses economic incenti es to ensure that it keeps going and doesn t
go back in time or incur an other glitch. 158 Proof-of-Work and Proofof-Stake mining protocols are cryptoeconomic for these purposes. Babbitt
and Dietz use a broader definition of cryptoeconomy as an economy
which is unconstrained by geography and mainstream institutions
political and legal where blockchains, instead of trusted third parties,
regulate behavior regarding transactions recorded on the ledger.159
Sinclair Davidson, Primavera De Filippi and Jason Potts discuss
innovation- and governance-centered approaches to cryptoeconomics and
eventually opt for a governance-centered approach that is informed by
institutional economics and public choice theory.160
Regardless of how one defines it, cryptoeconomics starts from the
given that the lex cryptographia operates without control by a central state
authority. The basic question is thus how to structure behavioral rules in
an environment where hierarchy and an enforcement apparatus are absent.
The absence of hierarchy and enforcement structures, which are essential
features of legal orders, is a unique aspect of the cryptoenvironment,
though it is not entirely novel. Arguably, international law operates in the
absence of hierarchy and enforcement mechanisms. The cryptoworld is
still different from the world of international law, however, as the
horizontal co-existence of sovereigns in international law makes up to
some extent for the absence of hierarchy. The lack of enforcement
mechanisms has been remedied through the development of international
courts, tribunals, and other compliance mechanisms, and international
156. Vlad
Zamfir,
What
Is Cryptoeconomics?,
YOUTUBE
(Feb.
1,
2015),
www.youtube.com/watch?v=9lw3s7iGUXQ [https://perma.cc/633V-ZJ2U].
157. See Alex Lielacher, An Introduction to Cryptoeconomics, BTCMANAGER (June 14, 2017),
https://btcmanager.com/an-introduction-to-cryptoeconomics/ [https://perma.cc/3ZMK-KH5S].
158. Vitalik Buterin, Visions, Part I: The Value of Blockchain Technology, ETHEREUM BLOG (Apr.
13, 2015), https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/04/13/visions-part-1-the-value-of-blockchain-technology/
[https://perma.cc/JV8Y-28MB].
159. Dave Babbitt & Joel Dietz, Crypto-economic Design: A Proposed Agent-Based Modelling
Effort, Presentation at SwarmFest 2014 18th Annual Meeting on Agent-Based Modeling &
Simulation (June 29 July 1, 2014).
160. Davidson et al., Economics of Blockchain, supra note 28 at 7 passim.
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reputation may be viewed as operating as a functional equivalent of
sanctions.
The cryptoworld, however, does not share these features: it is
composed of individuals that are unknown to each other, the only visible
sign to other members of a peer-to-peer network being public keys. In
order to make collaboration possible in this environment, given that public
trust is absent, blockchain designers have utilized the conception of
human agency developed in rational choice theory. The mutual interplay
between law and code generates coordination rules in the crypto
environment that are rule-like or quasi-legal; this lex cryptographia has
been largely informed by a cryptoeconomics approach, generating what
e ma call a la and cr ptoeconomics of blockchain.
Cryptoeconomics combines economic theory with cryptography to
create protocols for decentralized platforms, in an environment where
there is no trust at least in the traditional sense among the actors.
Cryptoeconomics provides the means to get blockchain participants
developers, miners, nodes and users to act in ways that would reduce
the likelihood of behaviors harming the individual welfare of blockchain
participants as well as social welfare in the cryptosociety. As De Filippi
and Wright summari e: e er interaction ith a blockchain is ultimatel
an economic transaction, and every party participating in the network
ser es as an economic actor. 161
The concept of value provides a basis for all of economic theory. A
market is a social system that operates through the price mechanism.
Commodities acquire value through the interplay of supply and demand.
Cryptoeconomics is based on a related theory of value. The commodity
on blockchain is the token, a pure representation of exchange value in the
cryptoeconomy. Tokens can be exchanged within the decentralized
network of peers for a variety of goods and services. Token economies
can either operate isolated on blockchain ( on-chain ) or in interaction
ith the ph sical orld ( off-chain ).
From the beginning, the idea behind the creation of Bitcoin was
essentially economic: it aimed to reduce transaction costs for financial
transactions by transcending the physical and political dimensions of
existing currencies.162 Currency and monetary units have traditionally
been ph sical units. The British pound, the Spanish peso, and the
Israeli shekel deri e from units of eight.163 Other currencies are
161. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 185.
162. Transaction costs and externalities are the centerpiece of modern law and economics. See R.
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 2 (1960).
163. ALEC ROSS, THE INDUSTRIES OF THE FUTURE 76 (2016).

Dimitropoulos (Do Not Delete)

1154

10/5/2020 3:54 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1117

indicative of the material they are made of; for e ample, the rupee used
in India and countries influenced by the Indian system, such as Mauritius,
comes from a Sanskrit word for silver. In the twentieth centur , [m]one
moved from being the physical representation of a valuable commodity to
an intangible s mbol of trust. 164 This is hat became kno n as fiat
mone . 165 Digitization of money as figures in accounts that are expended
with the use of credit cards followed towards the end of the century. Still,
the term plastic mone s mboli es the centuries-old understanding of
basing money on a physical instrumentality. Cryptocurrencies are
different.
Cryptocurrencies are fully built on codes rather than tangible materials.
But even more important, cryptocurrencies are not controlled by a central
authority. They are based on a system of production and management that
is fundamentally decentralized. There is no issuing body per se and no
governing authority in charge. Code regulates issuance, and management
is achieved through the network of peers making up the network of the
relevant cryptoasset. In a similar way, smart contracts and DAOs
decentralize transactions of all cryptoassets without the need for physical
and traditional intermediaries.
The immaterial and decentralized nature of cryptoassets makes them
fundamentally global. Cryptoassets such as cryptocurrencies are actually
designed for a transnational use via the Internet,166 without being confined
by state regulations or borders.167 These attributes of cryptoassets bear
important advantages for the payer. Cryptocurrency holders have to
engage in fewer transactions than the traditional currency holder in order
to conduct commerce in jurisdictions outside their own.168 Moreover,
there are no foreign exchange costs when using virtual currencies as
opposed to national currencies that need to be converted.169 This makes
cryptocurrencies a very useful and efficient tool for cross-border
payments and other money transfers.170 The only incurred costs are the
ones to convert the cryptocurrency into a national currency if the receiver
164. NIVEN ET AL., supra note 60, at 4.
165. See Stefan Eich, Old Utopias, New Tax Havens: The Politics of Bitcoin in Historical
Perspective, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 85, 96
(Phillip Hacker et al. eds., 2019) (discussing the development of money and bitcoin in historical
perspective).
166. Nicholas A. Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin Within the Reach of
the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT L L. 377, 388 (2013).
167. Id. at 405.
168. EUR. CENT. BANK, supra note 58, at 19.
169. Id.
170. Plassaras, supra note 166, at 388.
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does not wish to keep the virtual currency for future usage. 171 Payees
enjoy the same advantages, since cryptocurrencies have a global reach
which allows products to be sold to consumers located anywhere in the
world;172 In this sense, digital currencies are uni ersal in that the can
operate outside a system that uses multiple currencies, thereby avoiding
the transaction costs associated with currenc e change. 173 The same
applies to all cryptotokens.
Blockchain technology can reduce transaction costs by reducing the
role of intermediaries. While it is true that costs of transactions are
reduced, not necessarily all transaction costs are: there are, of course,
potentially high transaction costs for new users wishing to participate in
the blockchain-backed network. Networks may not be hierarchical, but
that does not mean they are without costs to entry and participation.174
2.

Economic Incentives in the Blockchain Cryptographic
Environment

Cryptoeconomics is based on two main building blocks: cryptography
and economic incentives to keep the network secure and incentivize
participation. The main cryptographic tools used in blockchain
technology are hash functions and digital signatures. Cryptography allows
for the transfer of information and value in ways that pseudonymize users
and transactions. The decentralized nature of the network creates the need
for mechanisms of coordination beyond hierarchy. Network participants
need to reach a consensus about the state of the network and the blocks
and accompanying transactions that are to be included in a blockchain.
This is achieved through consensus mechanisms (based on cryptographic
techniques) such as PoW and PoS.
It is in the design of these protocols that blockchain designers have
relied on insights from rational choice theory, with the purpose of steering
the behavior of blockchain participants towards maximizing social
welfare in the system by adding value to the network. These incentives
come in the form of block rewards and transaction fees for transactions
that are included in blocks.175 For example, PoW is the most commonly
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 388 89 (emphasis in original).
174. DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION
(2008).
175. See Raphael Auer, Beyond the Doomsday Economics of Proof-of-Work in Cryptocurrencies
(Bank for Int l Settlements (BIS), Working Paper No. 756, 2019)
https://www.bis.org/publ/work765.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T63-E3SQ].
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used algorithm and is used b Bitcoin. Miners ha e to pro e their ork
to propose a new block, which means devoting great amounts of
computational power to solve algorithmic hash puzzles that are based on
the properties of hash functions.176 Computing power can be translated
into energy consumption for energy-intensive use of computers, which
can be further translated into real-world money to buy computing power.
These resources become sunk costs if their blocks are not included in the
blockchain. Incentives and disincentives of this sort have led to the
professionalization of mining, and the de facto exclusion of many homebased miners that do not have adequate computing power to compete in
the system.
In essence, blockchain creates economic value out of the bits and bytes
of information stored in computers and on the Internet by means of
behavioral incentivization on the blockchain network. The first incentive
to be part of and operate in the net ork are so called block re ards. 177
Nodes that create new blocks for inclusion in a blockchain are rewarded
for their work by being allowed to include a special transaction the
coinbase transaction, which allows the same node to send a block reward
to their own address. The block reward decreases at a set rate.178 The
reward will only actually be received if the new block is accepted by the
rest of the network participants. The other nodes express their acceptance
by including the hash of the new block in the next block that is created.
This includes a further incentive for mining nodes to only include blocks
with valid transactions. Beyond block rewards, mining nodes also receive
transaction fees for each transaction that is included in the blocks. This is
a further incentive to mine for the system. Almost all cryptocurrencies
today require their users to attach fees to their transactions. The miners
then add transactions paying the highest fees into the blockchain and
derive income. This has been termed the fee market. 179
The second most popular consensus mechanism is PoS, which weighs

176. ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A
COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 64 67 (2016).
177. See Caner Taço lu, Block Reward, BINANCE ACAD. (2017 2020),
https://academy.binance.com/glossary/block-reward [https://perma.cc/VK63-YSKL].
178. This raises issues of inflation and deflation as well as other systemic issues that are beyond
the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Auer, supra note 175, at 4 (showing that once block rewards are
near zero, it could take months before a Bitcoin payment is final unless new technologies are put to
use to expedite them).
179. See generally Soumya Basu et al., Towards a Functional Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies
(Jan. 30, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3318327
[https://perma.cc/D8PN-XVQB] (discussing the concept of a cryptocurrency fee market ).
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each alidator s ote depending on the si e of their staked deposit.180 This
consensus mechanism works by having a set of validators take turns
proposing and voting on every next block. They lose their stake if the
block is not included in the blockchain, which operates as an incentive to
vote on blocks that include only valid transactions. In the PoS
environment, there are thus also incentives in some blockchain networks
for good blockchain citizenship and participation in the governance
scheme of the relevant blockchain. Users on the Tezos blockchain, for
example, are incentivized to be involved in the internal governance
process as developers by being rewarded with tokens.181 Ethereum has
plans to switch to using PoS from PoW.182
B.

A Spaceless World?

Blockchain is a machine that has the capacity to allow for the
application of the rational choice paradigm in a semi-automatic way on a
global scale. But what are the consequences of applying cryptoeconomics
in a world without borders? It is now a familiar insight of behavioral law
and economics that the rational choice paradigm fails to capture
accurately many features of human agency. What are the policy
implications of this new technology embedding these assumptions in a
framework of transaction and then globalizing it?
This section discusses the potential consequences of applying
cr ptoeconomics in a spaceless orld. Modernit has been identified as
the era of anxiety for space.183 Blockchain promises a new era of a
180. For PoS purposes, miners are usually referred to as validators (or sometimes forgers ), and
the generation of blocks as minting. See Felix Kuestahler, Polkadot Hello World #5: Minting,
Bonding, Staking, Slashing, MEDIUM (Nov. 21, 2018), https://medium.com/coinmonks/hellopolkadot-5-minting-bonding-staking-slashing-3c1a33c5a005 [https://perma.cc/Q68P-C8UR].
181. See infra section III.B; The Voting Process, infra note 295 and accompanying text.
182. See Eth 2.0 Economics, ETHHUB, https://docs.ethhub.io/ethereum-roadmap/ethereum-2.0/eth2.0-economics/ [https://perma.cc/JPX3-WB42].
183. See Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces, 16 DIACRITICS 22 23 (1986). There is a special
position in modern societies for land and land-based law. Initially, nearly all land was owned by the
government. Property in land is referred to as real property or real estate. See Massimo Meccarelli &
María Julia Solla Sastre, Spatial and Temporal Dimensions for Legal History: An Introduction, in 6
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS FOR LEGAL HISTORY: RESEARCH EXPERIENCES AND
ITINERARIES 3, 15 (Massimo Meccarelli & María Julia Solla Sastre eds., 2016) (using the notion of
spatiali ation ); id. ( [B] using this term e are underscoring the permanent tendenc of la
(understood in a broad sense) to take up a position in space, and to adhere to space. We wish thereby
to highlight a process that has a bearing on the contents and configurations assumed in the legal
dimension, a process that coe ists ith the moment of its manifestation. ); see also Massimo
Meccarelli, The Assumed Space: Pre-reflective Spatiality and Doctrinal Configurations in Juridical
Experience, 23 RECHTSGESCHICHTE 241 (2015). The sale of land, for example, is more complicated
and lengthier than the sale of a chattel and there are land registries and records in all countries in
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spaceless societ ,
hereb the digiti ation of transaction leads to the
diminishing importance of the individual, and accordingly the law in
society. This section questions the capacity of blockchain to achieve a
spaceless society. It then moves on to discuss the potential consequences
of de eloping a spaceless econom
ith the use of blockchain. Postwar neoliberal economists have already tried to advance the notion of an
economy of zero transaction costs. By contextualizing law and
cryptoeconomics with these efforts, this section lays the groundwork for
a new law and political economy framework that is developed in Part III.
1.

A Spaceless Society?

It is said that the world has already entered the Fourth Industrial
Revolution.184 The First Industrial Revolution was that of
industrialization, and it was characterized by factorization the factories
and the machines that ran them.185 Thus, it had a distinct spatial and
infrastructural nature. In a historically unprecedented urbanization spree,
people moved from rural places to booming cities, and new spaces were
created.186 The law had to react to the coming of the First Industrial
Revolution, as it fundamentally changed to regulate the new spaces and
the position of the individual in them.
The machine is coming back again, raising multiple societal and legal
questions. The new coming of the machine is being shaped to a large
extent by blockchain technology and is associated with a move from
muscle power to knowledge-based work.187 While during industrialization
the machine replaced manual work and physical labor, new technologies
such as AI, machine learning, and blockchain are and will be replacing
knowledge-based work. The Fourth Industrial Revolution poses
accordingly different challenges to law, regulation, and society at large.
Blockchain assumes that individuals are rational, as well as that all
transactions can take place in an autonomous way.188 Blockchain may
even be something beyond that. It is a technology built to bypass borders
fact usually, a central registry. This anxiety concerning land and space is now taking new
dimensions as an anxiety for infrastructure.
184. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What It Means and How to Respond,
FOREIGN AFFS. (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-12/fourthindustrial-revolution [https://perma.cc/3N3F-GF85].
185. See generally POLANYI, supra note 35, at 42, 78.
186. See id. at 96 97, 103.
187. See Schwab, supra note 184.
188. This is despite the fact that the technology was developed by individuals trying to move away
from the mainstream, such as techno-libertarians. See infra section III.C.1.
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and space. It is argued that [t]he notion of a [magic] orld computer
speaks to the idea that any application that runs on such a platform will be
global in reach (without national or geopolitical boundaries) and extend
ithout bound into the future. 189
In a move away from the horizon of the present, blockchain technology
is promising a new world. Blockchain promises the elimination, or rather
the minimization, of the role of the individual as well as of space in
society. This may potentially lead to the diminishing importance of the
law at least in its traditional form in the future.190 Almost all law is
about the regulation of individual behavior and the space in which
individuals live, work, and operate but blockchain is founded on an
anonymous network: a new social ontology.
The great aspiration of blockchain technology has been the elimination
of financial intermediaries.191 The removal of the human or institutional
third party is a core
alue proposition of blockchain.192
Disintermediation is the technolog s related promise. As a consequence
of their very structure, blockchains are widely considered to decentralize
and disintermediate economic relations. 193 When value is transferred
through blockchain networks, the traditional human-based intermediaries
responsible for verifying and validating transactions could become
obsolete.194 Disintermediation has the following double effect: first, it is
an effort to de-personalize transactions. This is reflected in the idea of
pseudonomity on blockchain.195 A second major goal of blockchain
technology has been to de-spatialize transactions. There should be no need
for banks and other financial institutions so long as the network of peers
can operate online.
189. Davidson et al., Economics of Blockchain, supra note 28, at 6.
190. On the relationship between the State as space and law in modernity, see Meccarelli & Sastre,
supra note 183, at 3, 9.
191. Brito, Shadab & Castillo, supra note 13, at 216 18.
192. FINCK, supra note 1, at 12.
193. Id. at 18.
194. Melanie Swan & Primavera de Filippi, Toward a Philosophy of Blockchain: A Symposium:
Introduction, 48 METAPHILOSOPHY 603, 605 (2017).
195. Despite the usual misperception that the blockchain anonymizes transactions, it does not. It
only achieves pseudonomity of transactions, with the potential of the identification of the persons
behind the transactions. In the Bitcoin blockchain, for example, Bitcoin users usually rely on
intermediaries to purchase Bitcoins; these intermediaries often require identifying information to open
an account. Authorities and/or hackers can potentially use this personal data to de-anonymize the user.
See Malte Möser, Anonymity of Bitcoin Transactions: An Analysis of Mixing Services, MUNSTER
BITCOIN CONF., July 17 18, 2013,
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e1ae/d9296c3af9139f48d15e043e2e8beab55409.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B7YR-8EFY].
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Both claims are limited in their accuracy, however.196 First, the
development of blockchain technology has in fact led to the development
of new intermediaries to replace banks and other traditional financial
institutions. New intermediaries have arisen in the cryptoasset and
blockchain environment. The cryptocurrency market has developed, and
most people will still rely on intermediaries when using
cryptocurrencies:197 trading platforms and exchanges of cryptocurrencies
to fiat currencies, digital wallet service providers, payment systems and
pricing indices, and other clearinghouses for cryptocurrency
transactions.198 New types of intermediaries are also being developed. In
order to preserve the anonymity of users, for example, new intermediary
services have been created that allow users to mix their coins, swap them
and change them from one address to another.199 This achieves some
further anonymity but adds one more intermediary between the user and
the token. Intermediary intervention can only be expected to increase as
the proportion of cryptocurrencies and other cryptoassets in the global
economy increases. The Bitcoin model of production of new currency, for
example, presents an effort to replicate scarcity in the market. Late
adopters and other interested individuals that have no capabilities in
coding will not be able to produce new coins through mining; the Bitcoin
economy will thus rely mostly on users buying Bitcoins with fiat currency
through exchanges, namely through the intervention of intermediaries.200
Finally, existing payment system intermediaries like PayPal have
included Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies in their services.201
In addition, blockchain has very obvious physical, personal, and spatial
representations which are showcased in the next section. At the same time,
196. Cf. also Kelvin F. K. Low & Eliza Mik, Pause the Blockchain Legal Revolution, 69 INT L &
COMPAR. L.Q. 135 37 (2020) (discussing misunderstandings about the promises of the technology).
197. See also id. at 160 63.
198. See Tyler Moore & Nicolas Christin, Beware of the Middleman: Empirical Analysis of
Bitcoin-Exchange Risk, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY: 17TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE 25, 26 (Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi ed., 2013); see also Dorit Ron & Adi Shamir,
Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph (Oct. 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with Cryptology ePrint Archive), http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/584 [https://perma.cc/3F7ZJRY3] (regarding transactions on Mt. Gox).
199. Cryptocurrency tumblers or mixers offer services that obscure the origin of
cryptocurrencies. See What Are Bitcoin Mixers?, BITCOIN MAG.,
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/guides/what-are-bitcoin-mixers [https://perma.cc/K8L3-5N2S].
200. Guadamuz & Marsden, supra note 13; Moore & Christin, supra note 198, at 25 33.
201. See Ryan Mac, PayPal Takes Baby Step Toward Bitcoin, Partners with Cryptocurrency
Processors, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2014/09/23/paypaltakes-small-step-toward-bitcoin-partners-with-cryptocurrency-processors/ [https://perma.cc/9PP4BU59].
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there is a new trend which is in direct confrontation with the initial
promise of the new technologies, and more specifically blockchain
technology: the importance of physical infrastructure is generally rising.
There is an expanding practice to develop physical infrastructure within
national borders, but also very importantly across national borders. There
is an accompanying global trend in various countries to develop legal
frameworks regarding infrastructure. These legislative instruments take
two forms: screening mechanisms for foreign investors based on national
security grounds202 and legislation identifying a separate category of
critical infrastructure. 203
Contemporary (public) law showcases two opposing trends:
disintermediation versus infrastructure growth, development, and
regulation. The next sections discuss the first trend in the context of
previous efforts to interpret the global economy as a spaceless institution;
other sections of the Article discuss the trends that contradict the
developments in the sphere of blockchain technology: the trend of the rise
of physical infrastructure in contemporary legal orders.
2.

A Spaceless Economy?

Blockchain is a novel social and economic construct that uses
principles of rational choice economics on a global scale. It promises a
global spaceless economy, allowing capital to flow freely across
borders204 and facilitating the circulation of products, services, and
202. Defense Production Act, Pub. L. No. 774, § 721 (1950), amended by Foreign Investment and
National Security Act (FINSA), Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (2007).
203. This is also reflected in statutes on the protection of critical infrastructure and critical
technologies that various countries have developed alongside investment screening laws. See Press
Release, Off. of the Press Sec y, Presidential Policy Directive Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil
[https://perma.cc/ULH7-ELCM]. Since 9/11 there has been an increased awareness in the United
States regarding a separate protected category of critical infrastructure. See id. The term critical
infrastructure has the meaning pro ided in section 1016(e) of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C.
5195c(e)), namely systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that
the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national economic securit , national public health or safet , or an combination of those matters. Id.
This Presidential Policy Directive identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors: Chemical; Commercial
Facilities; Communications; Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Defense Industrial Base; Emergency
Services; Energy; Financial Services; Food and Agriculture; Government Facilities; Healthcare and
Public Health; Information Technology; Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste; Transportation
Systems; and Water and Wastewater Systems. Id.
204. This is something that is not necessarily endorsed by classical political economy. According
to the founding father of comparative advantage theory, David Ricardo, capital does not and should
not move freely across borders. This was not only an observation of the time, but also a normative
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international trade more broadly. This is reminiscent of similar efforts in
the past to de elop a global spaceless econom .
Since at least the 1820s, economic liberalism has maintained three
classical tenets: a free labor market, the (international) gold standard, and
free trade.205 Free flow of capital was achieved in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries using the system of the international gold standard.
The gold standard is a monetary system in which participating countries
committed to fix their national currencies to a specified quantity of gold,
which makes the creation of money depend on the naturally existing
supplies of a scarce metal.206 According to the theory, because the
currency of each nation was backed by gold, a deficit in the balance of
payments of a country would lead to gold flowing out of the country,
causing a contraction in the money supply, an equivalent rise in interest
rates, a fall in prices and wages, and thus a rise in exports. This system of
free flow of money collapsed twice in the twentieth century.
There were later efforts to develop a new political economy for a
globalized world mostly by neoliberal economists.207 Austrian economist
Gottfried von Haberler, for example, developed an economic theory of a
spaceless orld, in hich he equated tariffs, distances, and the actions
of organized labor as obstacles comparable to the optimal distribution of
natural resources in the world.208 His image as that of a spaceless closed
economy embracing the hole orld. 209 The ideal policy according to
Haberler would make reality more closely resemble the model of a
spaceless world economy; in this spaceless world neither man-made nor
geographical obstacles hindered the most efficient allocation of resources

underpinning of the theor ; according to Da id Ricardo, [e] perience, ho e er, sho s, that the
fancied or real insecurity of capital, when not under the immediate control of its owner, together with
the natural disinclination which every man has to quit the country of his birth and connections, and
intrust himself with all his habits fixed, to a strange government and new laws, checks the emigration
of capital. These feelings, which I should be sorry to see weakened, induce most men of property to
be satisfied with a low rate of profits in their own country, rather than seek a more advantageous
emplo ment for their ealth in foreign nations. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY AND TAXATION 128 29 (3d ed. 1817).
205. POLANYI, supra note 34, at 141.
206. See Michael D. Bordo, Gold Standard, ECONLIB,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GoldStandard.html [https://perma.cc/S4WH-27WV].
207. See generally QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF
NEOLIBERALISM (2018) (on the global dimensions of neoliberalism). See also David Singh Grewal
& Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 3 (2014)
(on the definition of neoliberalism).
208. GOTTFRIED HABERLER, PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF
CYCLICAL MOVEMENTS 303 (1937).
209. Id.
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through the mechanisms of the free market. In the world of hypothetical
unity of Haberler, there were some obstacles that needed to be overcome.
Haberler equated tariffs with communication, transportation, as well as
physical and geographical barriers.210 The target was to tame the rising
tariffs that governments imposed to fence their economies from the
outside world.211
This imagery of a spaceless economy and a world of zero transaction
costs is the world that is promised and promoted by blockchain.
Cryptocurrencies could potentially operate as a more efficient alternative
to the gold standard because they minimize transaction costs for global
transactions; blockchain, moreover, enhances economic liberalism
through the facilitation of international trade. But both depend as did
classical liberalism and neoliberal efforts that followed on what scholars
ha e called the depolitici ation of the econom . The ne t section
proceeds to a reality check of this promise, as well as setting the basis for
a normative reconsideration of the promise, which is the task for the final
Part of the Article.
C.

The Infrastructural Dimension of Blockchain

Blockchain has so far been identified as a new technology that has the
potential to develop into an overarching global social structure backed by
rational choice law and cryptoeconomics. This section demonstrates that
blockchain is something beyond that even. Blockchain has an
infrastructural nature: it is a global infrastructure that helps in the
facilitation of other fields of life.
1.

The Notion of Infrastructure

There is a new trend in the legal, economics, and more broadly social
science literature to interpret law and society from an infrastructural
perspective.212 There are different ways to interpret the notion of
210. Separating between vertical and horizontal distances for goods to travel. See GOTTFRIED
HABERLER, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 309 (1936). This is brought to expression very
vividly by Arthur Salter, the head of the economics and financial section of the League of Nations,
ho in 1932 rote: [t]he place hich protecti e tariffs occup in the orld s econom and, regarded
as a whole, their normal and inevitable effect, are perfectly clear. They are like the natural
impediments of mountain-range or other obstacles to transport which increase the price paid for the
benefits and economies resulting from the interchange of products of idel sundered regions.
ARTHUR SALTER, RECOVERY: THE SECOND EFFORT 196 (1932).
211. The liberal geography of the League economists cast tariffs as metaphorical barriers with
height to be climbed o er. SLOBODIAN, supra note 207, at 53.
212. See generally FRISCHMANN, supra note 33 (discussing how society benefits from
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infrastructure.213 The Oxford English Dictionary defines infrastructure as
the basic s stems and ser ices that are necessar for a countr or an
organization to run smoothly, for example buildings, transportation, and
ater and po er supplies. 214 Professor Gómez-Ibáñez gives a definition
that equates infrastructure services with public utilities and places a focus

infrastructure resources, and presenting ideas on the design of infrastructure management); David
Singh Grewal, Before Peer Production: Infrastructure Gaps and the Architecture of Openness in
Synthetic Biology, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 143 (2017) (using the example of synthetic biology, and
offering ideas on a reorientation regarding how state action can help to generate the infrastructure of
emerging fields in ways that prove conducive to their development); K. Sabeel Rahman,
Infrastructural Regulation and the New Utilities, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 911 (2018) [hereinafter
Rahman, Infrastructural Regulation]; K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social
Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2018)
(offering an infrastructural understanding of new utilities such as the Internet, and a framework of
infrastructural regulation ); Kingsbur , supra note 33 (putting for ard the idea of infrastructure as
regulation as a a of opening up thinking about international la and technolog ).
Regarding the turn to infrastructure in the social sciences, see, e.g., Susan Leigh Star, The
Ethnography of Infrastructure, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 377 (1999) (on an ethnographic account);
Stephen Graham & Nigel Thrift, Out of Order: Understanding Repair and Maintenance, 24 THEORY,
CULTURE & SOC Y 1 (2007) (on a broad social scientific account to infrastructure relating to
maintenance-related questions); Brian Larkin, The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure, 42 ANN.
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 327 (2013) (on an anthropological account of infrastructure); KELLER
EASTERLING, EXTRASTATECRAFT: THE POWER OF INFRASTRUCTURE SPACE (2014) (on an account
from the perspective of the interaction between architecture and social science); SHEILA JASANOFF,
THE ETHICS OF INVENTION: TECHNOLOGY AND THE HUMAN FUTURE (2016) (on the interaction
between science and technology in law, politics, and policy in the State); Alec Ross, Cities as
Innovation Hubs, in THE INDUSTRIES OF THE FUTURE 196 98 (2016); Jedediah Britton-Purdy, The
World We ve Built, DISSENT (July 3, 2018), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/worldwe-built-sovereign-nature-infrastructure-leviathan [https://perma.cc/J569-B3E6] (suggesting that
human beings are infrastructural beings).
213. NAT L RSCH. COUNCIL, COMM. ON INFRASTRUCTURE INNOVATION, INFRASTRUCTURE FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: FRAMEWORK FOR A RESEARCH AGENDA (1987),
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/798/infrastructure-for-the-21st-century-framework-for-a-researchagenda [perma.cc/9BTQ-X8J9]; David Alan Aschauer, Why Is Infrastructure Important?, NEW ENG.
ECON. REV. 21 (1990); Louis P. Cain, Historical Perspective on Infrastructure and US Economic
Development, 27 REG L SCI. & URB. ECON. 117 (1997); Lars-Hendrik Röller & Leonard Waverman,
Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic Development: A Simultaneous Approach, 91 AM.
ECON. REV. 909 (2001); César Calderón & Luis Servén, The Effects of Infrastructure Development
on Growth and Income Distribution (Working Paper No. 3400, 2004),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/14136/WPS3400.pdf?sequence=1&i
sAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/RFB8-676S]; Johan Fourie, Economic Infrastructure: A Review of
Definitions, Theory and Empirics, 74 S. AFR. J. ECON. 422 (2006); Larry Beeferman & Allan Wain,
Infrastructure: Defining Matters (Jan. 12, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714308 [https://perma.cc/2Q8J-VNZE].
214. Infrastructure, OXFORD LEARNER S DICTIONARIES,
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/american_english/infrastructure
[https://perma.cc/ES3A-Z4EN]; see also Infrastructure, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV.,
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4511 [https://perma.cc/ZD8A-5ZWD] (providing
OECD s definition of infrastructure).
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on the network structure of infrastructure.215 His definition includes
underground facilities such as piped ater and se age, roads, rail a s,
and [e]lectric po er and telecommunications distributed via capitalintensive networks using durable, immobile investments.216
An older study of the U.S. National Research Council emphasizes the
operational aspects of infrastructure:
A comprehension of infrastructure spans not only these public
works facilities, but also the operating procedures, management
practices, and development policies that interact together with
societal demand and the physical world to facilitate the transport
of people and goods, provision of water for drinking and a variety
of other uses, safe disposal of societ s aste products, pro ision
of energy where it is needed, and transmission of information
within and between communities.217
According to Susan Leigh Star, infrastructure has nine key
characteristics.218 First, it is embedded, in the sense that it is sunk into
and inside of other structures; second, it is transparent as it does not
have to be reinvented each time or assembled for each task; third, it offers
temporal or spatial reach or scope; fourth, it is learned by its users; fifth,
it is linked to conventions of practice, e.g., routines of electricity use;
sixth, it embodies standards; seventh, it is built on an installed base of
sunk capital; eighth, it is fixed in modular increments, not built all at once
or globally; finally, it tends to become visible upon breakdown.219
Economics differentiates between two main types of infrastructure:
economic infrastructure as the basic facilities that directly affect the
production and distribution in an economy (namely roads, railways,
telecommunication systems, waterways, airways, financial institutions,
electricity, water supply, and so on) and social infrastructure understood
as basic amenities that do not directly influence the economic activities,
but may have an indirect impact on the economy (namely education,
health services, sanitation and so on).220
Blockchain has some of the attributes of infrastructure in the definitions
presented in the previous paragraphs. It is a network-based system that
215. JOSÉ A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS AND
DISCRETION 4 (2003).
216. Id.
217. NAT L RSCH. COUNCIL, IN OUR OWN BACKYARD: PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE IMPROVEMENT
OF THE NATION S INFRASTRUCTURE 21 (1993), https://www.nap.edu/read/2205/chapter/4#20
[https://perma.cc/N2B5-2SCG].
218. Star, supra note 212, at 381 82.
219. Id.
220. See FRISCHMANN, supra note 33, at 65.
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facilitates various operations in the lives of individuals in the economic,
but also in the social, sphere of life through complicated cryptographic
operating procedures and management practices. Although blockchain
developed in the private sector, the public sector has adopted it, and
blockchain has a unique tendency towards publicness in the sense of open
access to all potential participants. The next section discusses the physical
infrastructural dimensions of blockchain technology, while also
showcasing the nature of blockchain as a non-physical infrastructure.
2.

The Infrastructural Nature of Blockchain Technology: From
Utopia to Heterotopia

Blockchain technology imagined and promised what Michel Foucault
called a placeless place, different from the spatial orld, here
everything would be possible.221 This is what global collective imagery
calls a utopia, namel fundamentall unreal spaces. 222 Bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies have been produced by libertarians, anarchists, and
other opponents of the global financial system in an effort to by-pass the
institutions of the financial markets, the central banks, and the commercial
banks.223 This at least was the dream of Satoshi Nakamoto and his
followers.224 Blockchain is now promising the same beyond the financial
world into all aspects of individual and social life. Reality has at least
so far turned out to be different. What is on offer rather is a
heterotopia, a place, according to Foucault, different from the normal
space but within the actual world, that can eventually be captured by it.225
Lawrence Lessig has already remarked about cyberspace in general that
[ ]ou are ne er just in cyberspace; you never just go there. You are
al a s both in real space and in c berspace at the same time. 226
Modern law has a distinct spatial dimension. Contemporary law is
becoming even more infrastructural. Blockchain technology has a
personal and spatial dimension, hich ma be termed the infrastructural
dimension of blockchain. Blockchain has ph sical manifestations, as
well as produces effects on the physical environment; it is at the same time
a non-physical infrastructure.

221. Foucault, supra note 183, at 24.
222. Id.
223. NAKAMOTO, supra note 7. See also Primavera De Filippi, Bitcoin: A Regulatory Nightmare
to a Libertarian Dream, INTERNET POL Y REV., May 23, 2014, at 1, 1.
224. NAKAMOTO, supra note 7.
225. Foucault, supra note 183, at 24.
226. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 21 (1999) (emphasis in
original).
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Types of Infrastructural Dimensions of Blockchain
i.

Physical Manifestations

Blockchain has its own distinct physical and spatial manifestations.
First of all, individuals and computers compose the nodes of a blockchain;
physical servers in the form of physical IT infrastructures are used to store
the data produced on any blockchain. In addition, companies have
nowadays been established and developed physical spaces in order to host
miners and mining activities that are so vital for the operation of
blockchain.227 Moreover, while the pseudonymity of the founder of
Bitcoin worked towards reinforcing a non-personal imagery of
blockchain, blockchain leaders such as the founders of Ethereum have
been very vocal about their technology and active in its promotion.228
While software developers were initially in the background, they have
come into the foreground of the technology and the eyes of the public,
further adding to a more express understanding of the infrastructural
dimension of blockchain. Overall, blockchain technology has not
eliminated the need for consensus by individuals.229
In addition, governments are creating new spaces such as innovation
hubs to host activities relating to new technologies. Increasingly,
countries around the world have started adopting policies directed towards
the promotion of FinTech startups, prominently also including startups
developing blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies. FinTech
promotion policies involve predominantly two regulatory measures: (i)
launching innovation hubs to help FinTech startups comply with the
relevant laws and regulations, and, (ii) establishing regulatory sandboxes
for new financial services participants,230 including the lowering of
licensing barriers for digital financial services participants reaching
sometimes all the way to FinTech licensing exemptions. The regulatory
sandbox allows businesses to test innovative products, services, business

227. Bitcoin Mining Centralization: The Market Is Fixing Itself, 99 BITCOINS (June 19, 2018, 6:21
PM), https://99bitcoins.com/bitcoin-mining-free-market/ [https://perma.cc/XL67-FAZ8].
228. See, e.g., Press Release, President of Russ., Meeting with Founder of Ethereum Project Vitalik
Buterin (June 2, 2017), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54677 [https://perma.cc/8JUQ9KXG] (on the meeting of Vladimir Putin with Vitalik Buterin discussing the possibility of using the
Ethereum blockchain technology in Russia).
229. FINCK, supra note 1, at 6.
230. See generally Pavel Shoust, Regulators and Fintech: Influence Is Mutual?, RUSSIAN ELEC.
MONEY ASS N (Sept. 21, 2016), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/770171476811898530/Session-4Pavel-Shoust-Regulatory-Sandboxes-21-09-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2TR-VLNQ]; Freehills,
supra note 144.
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models, and delivery mechanisms in a more relaxed regulatory
environment.
Innovation hubs offer support to FinTech businesses, namely a
dedicated team and contact for FinTech business that has the innovation
potential and helps them understand the relevant regulatory framework
and how it applies to them; moreover, they offer assistance in preparing
and making an application for authorization and dedicated contact.231
Since the United Kingdom took the lead in creating the U.K. Innovation
Hub and a special regulatory regime for FinTech in 2015, many more
countries, especially in the Asia Pacific region like Australia, Hong Kong,
Malaysia, and Singapore, have followed its lead.232 The Australian
Government has undertaken important initiatives in regulating
cryptocurrency as a technology.233 The Australian Securities and
Investment Commission (ASIC) has also launched an Innovation Hub to
help FinTech startups on compliance matters; moreover, it established a
regulator sandbo for digital ser ices participants. Australia s regulator
sandbox framework is comprised of three options for testing a new
product or service without a license.234 The SEC has also finally launched
FinHub for the agency to connect with FinTech innovators, developers,
and entrepreneurs.235
Finally, cryptoassets have an on-chain value that is endogenous to the
token; this is for example the case with cryptocurrencies. Sometimes
tokens only represent an asset, in the form of a product, service or
entitlement, in the physical world.236 There are thus very often gates from
the digital to the physical world and the other way around. Smart contracts

231. The U.K. FCA s Project Innovate now FCA Innovation is a very good example since
it operates an Innovation Hub and a Regulatory Sandbox. Many of the projects under the FCA
Regulatory Sandbox deal with blockchain technology-related products; see generally FCA
Innovation Fintech, Regtech, and Innovative Businesses, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.,
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/innovation [https://perma.cc/39UR-F5WQ].
232. See Freehills, supra note 144.
233. See generally COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., BACKING AUSTRALIAN FINTECH (2016),
http://fintech.treasury.gov.au/files/2016/03/Fintech-March-2016-v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2ZFE2R5] (discussing the initiatives in Australia).
234. See AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM N, REGULATORY GUIDE 257: TESTING FINTECH
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES WITHOUT HOLDING AN AFS OR CREDIT LICENCE (Aug. 2017),
https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/regulatory-guides/rg-257-testing-fintechproducts-and-services-without-holding-an-afs-or-credit-licence/ [https://perma.cc/5BUA-G4LE].
The FinTech licensing exemption was initially proposed in Consultation Paper 260 (CP 260). Further,
in CP 260 there are also measures to facilitate innovation in financial services.
235. See generally FinHub: Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM N, https://www.sec.gov/finhub [https://perma.cc/P9UV-KW8B].
236. FINCK, supra note 1, at 10.
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and DAOs ha e e it-points of interaction ith the physical world using
sensors that are called oracles. 237 Oracles record and introduce
information from the physical to the digital blockchain world, with a
particular relevance for the Internet of Things.238
ii.

Effects on Individuals and Society

New technologies will also unavoidably always have an effect on
individuals and on the physical environment.239 First, they create a sharp
divide between those with access to the Internet and those without, or with
very poor connectivity. The digital divide is even more pronounced in this
sphere.240 Bitcoin was created as the currency of a specific community of
people, and is still very largely used by the same community.
Cryptocurrencies as a new form of global currency may eventually turn
out to be the currency of the privileged parts of the global population with
access to the Internet. The same may apply to trade with cryptotokens.
This brings us to the second manifestation, namely the divide between
those who know how to code and those who do not. Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies are peculiar in the production of new value in the system
in that new Bitcoins are generated as a reward and at the same time as an
incentive for the miners as the guardians of the system. Not everybody
has the knowledge, capabilities, or the desire to code and become a miner;
the production of new wealth is thus reserved either to the individuals that
belong to the first community that established Bitcoin as a club privilege
or to new mining companies that are involved in the business of producing
new Bitcoins.
The third possible manifestation is that caused by the geography as well
as the natural and climatic conditions prevalent in a country.241 Mining
takes significant computing power. 242 Countries with colder climates may
237. See generally @Artem, How Do Oracle Services Work Under the Hood?, ETHEREUM: STACK
EXCH. (Jan. 23, 2017, 7:53 AM), https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/11589/how-dooracle-services-work-under-the-hood [https://perma.cc/F8B6-D2RN]. See also Alexander Egberts,
The Oracle Problem: An Analysis of How Blockchain Oracles Undermine the Advantages of
Decentralized Ledger Systems (Dec. 12, 2017) (M.A. thesis, EBS Universität für Wirtschaft und
Recht) (on file with SSRN), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382343 [https://perma.cc/HL9G-EKV8].
238. De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 1.
239. See REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN, supra note 12.
240. Beyond Bitcoin: Using Blockchain to Advance the SDGs, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME,
https://feature.undp.org/beyond-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/5C2N-MVT8] ( Then there is the digital
divide: it is the most marginalized, the poor, rural populations, and the displaced who are the least
likely to have access to reliable Internet connections. ).
241. See generally id.
242. See Nosayba El-Sayed et al., Temperature Management in Data Centers: Why Some (Might)
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be able to achieve greater computing power than those with warm
climates. Huge parts of the world are by default excluded from the
cryptocurrency map as a natural locus for mining, like the Middle East,
large parts of Latin America, Central Africa, or even the Mediterranean.
This creates new comparative advantages for the cooler countries in
northern Europe and North America. Additionally, the verification
process for blockchain, such as mining on the Bitcoin blockchain, is a
very resource intensive exercise.243 Mining and verification processes
may have very adverse consequences on the environment that will
eventually have to be mitigated.244
Finally, the rise of blockchain technology in the financial sector
currencies and transactions led to some extent to the strengthening of
banks and other financial institutions.245 While they were meant to be
bypassed, they have captured the field of development of new
technologies relating to blockchain,246 and are now at the forefront of
blockchain technology developments.247 This way they may be bypassing
certain restrictions that were imposed on them in the aftermath of the
financial crisis, which may eventually lead to the need for new
interventions on behalf of financial and other regulators.
b.

Blockchain as Non-Physical Infrastructure

Nontraditional or intellectual infrastructure is becoming at least as
important as traditional infrastructure i.e., physical infrastructure.248
Traditional infrastructure is large-scale physical resource made by
humans for public consumption and includes the
underl ing
frame ork of a s stem or the underl ing foundation of a s stem, like
transportation s stems, including highway, railway, and airline systems
as ell as ports; communication s stems, such as telephone and postal

Like it Hot, SIGMETRICS, June 11 15, 2012, http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~bianca/papers/
temperature_cam.pdf [https://perma.cc/55QJ-L59G] (discussing temperature management in data
centers, as well the effect of higher data center temperatures on server performance and power).
243. Jon Truby, Decarbonizing Bitcoin: Law and Policy Choices for Reducing the Energy
Consumption of Blockchain Technologies and Digital Currencies, 44 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI.
399, 401 (2018). PoS algorithms aim at improving energy efficiency of public blockchains. See Proof
of
Stake
FAQs,
ETHEREUM
WIKI,
https://eth.wiki/en/concepts/proof-of-stake-faqs
[https://perma.cc/W7C7-VYB6].
244. Truby, supra note 243, at 399.
245. See GANNE, supra note 4, at 53 54 (calling this development an irony ).
246. Id. at 51 55.
247. Id.
248. FRISCHMANN, supra note 33, at 4.
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net orks; governance systems, like courts; basic public ser ices and
facilities, such as schools, energ and ater s stems.249
According to Frischmann,
nontraditional
and
intellectual
infrastructure are nontraditional infrastructure resources enabling,
framing, and supporting a wide range of productive activities mostly
downstream of economic and social nature in our lives.250 According to
U.S. la , the term critical infrastructure as defined in section 1016(e)
of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and Presidential Policy Directive-21
co ers s stems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safet , or an combination of those matters. 251
Blockchain is a general-purpose virtual technology with physical
manifestations that purports to cover all areas of life by providing the
background conditions for the exercise of the relevant activities, and thus
enabling them. It may therefore be conceived of as an intellectual
infrastructure of this sort.252
3.

Blockchain as a Global Infrastructure

Blockchain has an infrastructural nature, both in its physical and nonphysical dimension. Legislative frameworks around the world have
started identifying blockchain technology as infrastructure.253 At the same
time, the infrastructure of blockchain has a global outreach. The Bitcoin
blockchain operates as a financial market infrastructure for orld ide
monetary transactions.254 Blockchain could become the basis of the future
trade infrastructure, supporting transactions among logistics and
transportation companies, which constitute the backbone of international
trade.255 In more general terms, blockchains pro ide the infrastructure
249. Id. at 3 4.
250. Id. at 4, 253.
251. Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec y, Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 203 (emphasis
added).
252. See FRISCHMANN, supra note 33, at 253 (classifying general purpose technologies as
intellectual infrastructure).
253. It may be interesting to note that the Russian Federation s legislation on foreign in estment
screening specifically mentions cryptographic services with a view to controlling foreign investment
in companies working in the area of cryptography. See, e.g., On the Procedures for Foreign
Investments in Companies of Strategic Significance for National Defense and Security (the
Strategic Companies Law ), SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF]
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2008, No. 57-FZ.
254. Walch, supra note 32.
255. GANNE, supra note 4, at 41.
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of the global services industry.256
The infrastructural re-interpretation of blockchain shows clearly that
blockchains are more than computers or digital net orks;257
blockchains will moreover have effects on the physical environment on a
global scale. It is on the infrastructural dimension of blockchain
technology that a proper political economy of blockchain may be built.
This is the task for the final Part of this Article.
III. TOWARDS A LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
FRAMEWORK OF BLOCKCHAIN
One cannot help but notice a considerable paradox in the development
of blockchain. While Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, and blockchain as such
have been envisaged and created by opponents of the mainstream
economic and financial system, they have resorted to mainstream
economic principles for the structuring of the rules of the
cryptoenvironment. This has led to a complex emerging political economy
of blockchain.
Political economy was in the beginnings of the development of
classical economics synonymous to economics.258 Over the years it took
on the meaning of the interplay between the State and the economy; given
the dominance of the rational choice paradigm in economics and political
science it (also) came to mean the application of rational choice theory to
analysis of government decision-making.259 Following recent scholarship
on law and political economy, the Article in its final Part purports to
de elop a ne la and political econom frame ork for blockchain.260
The notion of political economy is used in the broadest sense of a
discipline that looks into the relationship between politics and the
economy generally.261 This type of relationship is discernible both within
256. See id. at 56 ( If a re olution [of the ser ices industr
ith the use of the blockchain
technology] does occur, it is more likely to be internal: the intrinsic characteristics of Blockchain and
the possibility to automate transactions through smart contracts make it an attractive tool for
companies to cut costs and streamline processes. If the initiatives underway prove conclusive,
Blockchain could ell become the future infrastructure of the ser ices industr . Because of its
automation capabilities, Blockchain could be to the services sector what robots have been to
manufacturing. ).
257. See supra section II.B.1 (discussing blockchain as a world computer ).
258. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Power and Wealth in a Competitive Capitalist Economy,
21 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 324, 324 (1992).
259. Id.
260. See infra Part III.
261. See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 34, at 1792 ( Rather, e intend the older and more
foundational usage familiar to nineteenth-centur audiences, hich persisted in traditions of radical
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the lex cryptographia, and in the relationship between the lex
cryptographia and the law of the physical world. The first section of the
final Part of the Article discusses the nature of blockchain as commons;
the subsequent sections then discuss law and political economy
frameworks for lex cryptographia, which is in the process of being
developed, alongside the political economy of the interaction between the
law of the physical world and blockchain.
A.

Blockchains as Infrastructural Commons

The significance of having identified blockchains as infrastructures lies
in the consequences that may be drawn from such characterization.
Infrastructures face the problem of underprovision, which is identified
both by public welfare economics and regulatory economics.262 Demand
for infrastructure is derived from output markets.263 Accordingly, demand
manifestation problems may lead to undersupply of infrastructures and
infrastructural services; the market mechanism will not fully take into
account or provide the services for the broader set of social benefits
attributable to public or social goods.264 Various forms of government
intervention can resolve underprovision problems.265
Infrastructures very often have the natural features of commons.266
Mainstream economic theory suggests that the best way to manage
commons is to privatize them.267 Non-mainstream approaches to
economics suggest that infrastructure may be managed as commons. 268
Frischmann summarizes commons management as a situation where

political economy until a few decades ago. This political economy investigates the relation of politics
to the economy, understanding that the economy is always already political in both its origins and its
consequences. (emphasis in original)); Martha T. McCluskey et al., Law and Economics:
Contemporary Approaches, 35 YALE L. & POL Y REV. 297, 300 01 (2016). See generally Association
for the Promotion of Political Economy and the Law (APPEAL) and the Journal of Law and Political
Economy (JLPE).
262. FRISCHMANN, supra note 33, at 12 15. In addition, infrastructures present the decreasing cost
phenomenon: high upfront cost for construction, and decreasing cost for maintenance, especially as
use increases. There are moreover capacity constraints: there is a limit to nonrivalrous consumption.
Id. at 13 14.
263. Id. at 66, 69.
264. Id.
265. See id. at 14 15.
266. See id. at 1 9 (on the identification of infrastructure as commons and the idea of commons
management ); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (on the
notion of commons ).
267. See Hardin, supra note 266, at 1245, 1247 (for a classical statement of this approach).
268. See FRISCHMANN, supra note 33, at 1 9.
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resources are shared among members of a communit on
nondiscriminatory terms . . . that do not depend on the users identit or
intended use . . . . This does not mean that use of the resource is free or
comes without any terms and conditions. 269
While commons management may not necessarily be justified by
traditional economics that focuses on supply, a demand-side perspective
to infrastructure may give an appropriate justification for commons
management.270 A demand-side perspective reorients the focus towards
the user of the infrastructure. It actually looks at how to allow the user to
make a decision about what to do with the opportunities and capabilities
provided by the infrastructure. It, moreover, functions as a social option,
when it is uncertain which users or even uses will generate social value
with a view to the future. Additionally, a demand-side perspective allows
us to focus on the variety of positive externalities that can take place under
a commons management framework of infrastructural resources. Again,
according to Frischmann:
Commons management structures the relationships between
infrastructure and infrastructure-dependent systems in a manner
that creates a spillover-rich environment, where spillovers flow
from the many productive activities of users. These activities
yield new and unanticipated innovations, knowledge, social
capital, and other public and social goods that lead to economic
growth and development as well as social welfare improvements
not fully reflected in traditional economic measures.271
Infrastructure managed as commons has the potential to generate
significant positi e e ternalities, 272 which are third-party effects that
may result in social gains; it may thus permit a wide range of downstream
producers of private, public, and social goods to flourish.273 Infrastructure
resources facilitate third-party effects, namely productive behaviors by
users that affect third parties users, or non-users of the infrastructure
in an accidental, incidental, and not especiall rele ant
a to the
infrastructure provider or user.274 This may result in a scenario of a
269. Id. at 92 (emphasis in original); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 19 25
(2001).
270. See id. at 93 95.
271. Id. at 94.
272. Positive externalities are otherwise referred to as spillo ers, or external benefits. See
generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).
273. YOCHAI BENKLER, PROPERTY, COMMONS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: TOWARDS A CORE
COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE 3, 47 49 (2001).
274. FRISCHMANN, supra note 33, at 11 12. For example, the electricity grid, telephone networks,
the Internet, etc., contribute value by way of new opportunities, cost reduction, scale efficiencies, etc.
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comed of the commons, here open access to a resource ma lead to
scale returns, namely greater social value with greater use of the
resources.275 Spillover effects may generate private value. Spillover
effects may also very importantly generate social value (i.e., social returns
on infrastructure investment contributing to the improvement of social
networks and social ties, development of new ideas, innovation, etc.). For
example, roads except for commerce also contribute to increased
socialization, cultural and other types of social exchange.
Commons management is independent of market or government
provision of the relevant infrastructural good. Governments and the
private sector alike may choose whether or not to manage infrastructure
and other public goods as commons. Finally, government may intervene
to mandate the provision of a private infrastructure as commons.276 In all
three cases, affording access to infrastructure in a non-discriminatory way
while managing congestion is key. Regulators in the United States and
elsewhere have developed legal tools mandating such terms of use of
infrastructural resources, such as the essential facility doctrine and the
common carrier doctrine.277
Along the same lines, Sabeel Rahman suggests various regulatory tools
with a view to holding infrastructural power accountable; these tools are
largely inspired by twentieth century utility regulation.278 The broader
idea is to apply utility regulation to infrastructural goods and ser ices,
with the ultimate goal of assuring fair and equal access to the identified
infrastructural goods.279 One proposed intervention is regulatory
oversight, which imposes affirmative obligations.280 These obligations
include duties to provide services to marginalized individuals and
communities, and to comply with legal standards for nondiscrimination
such as serving all customers, having reasonable rates, prohibiting unjust
discrimination, and requiring service providers to establish connections
Id.
275. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986).
276. See FRISCHMANN, supra note 33, at 99 114 (discussing the various ways in which government
can intervene to establish commons management of infrastructure).
277. See id. at 100. Frischmann identifies four such types of inter ention: (1) public regulation of
private infrastructure providers mandating nondiscriminatory access for competitors; (2) public
regulation of private infrastructure providers mandating nondiscriminatory access for consumers; (3)
dedication of privately produced infrastructure to the public domain; (4) public provision of
infrastructure on a nondiscriminatory basis. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
278. Rahman, Infrastructural Regulation, supra note 212, at 927 30.
279. Id. at 929, 931
280. Id. at 928.
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with each other.281
Second, government may intervene to provide firewalls and
structuralist regulation.282 Instead of addressing individual transactions,
government may alter the corporate structure of the infrastructural firm
itself as a way to reduce ex ante the tendency towards problematic
transactions in the first place.283 An example of a firewall would be the
mandate to isolate and separate the basic and stable core service from
riskier or more unstable alternatives, e.g., mandating the separation of
investment from commercial banking or not allowing mergers of
oligopolistic companies. Many more conflict-of-interest requirements and
financial regulations limiting the kinds of funding and investment regimes
permitted for infrastructural firms may be envisaged.
Third, a solution would be for government to provide the infrastructural
service, or for government to provide for public options.284 Direct
provision by government means that public bodies themselves would
directly provide the relevant infrastructural good or service, either from
the beginning or through expropriation in the form of nationalization, or
municipalization.285 The idea of pro ision of a public option means that
a government provider would compete with private providers, offering,
for example a basic version of the same service.286
Blockchain as infrastructure may also mean moving towards an
understanding of blockchain management as infrastructural commons.
Blockchain economics are based on traditional economics. New tools may
thus be needed to move beyond the rational autonomy conundrum of
blockchain. Acknowledging the infrastructural dimension of blockchain
technology may potentially help identify new meanings and uses of
blockchain, as well as a new role for government in its interaction with
the technology. Most importantly, government may intervene to mandate
the types of interventions that were identified above regarding
infrastructure service provision. Commons management is a postulate
both for the political economy of the lex cryptographia and the interaction
between blockchain and the law of the physical world. Identifying
blockchains as infrastructural commons would indicate that law and
regulation should not be relegated to the role of facilitating the operation
of the invisible hand of the market by and within blockchain; rather, law
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 930.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and regulation should acquire more active roles, such as safeguarding
access on non-discriminatory terms to potential users.287 This is all the
more the case given that there is a general tendency by big technology
companies and mainstream financial institutions to create private and
permissioned blockchains, despite the technology being initially
developed to accommodate public and permissionless blockchains.
B.

The Political Economy of Lex Cryptographia

Are new technologies, and blockchains, data-driven neutral machines
that go beyond politics? There is one straightforward answer to this
question: no. Blockchain governance and blockchain itself are heavily
politicized enterprises. While blockchains are perceived as self-enforcing
mechanisms, they are in fact, not. They are based on individuals who
make decisions for internal governance purposes. Their decisions may be
subject to political or other interests.288 In addition, the code and
underlying algorithms may be subject to various cognitive biases of the
developers resulting in discrimination and unfairness.289
It ma be said that a societal econom of blockchain has replaced
traditional political economy. Namely, a non-State based economy has
emerged in which certain societal rules replace the rules of a polity. The
societal economy of blockchain is, moreover, by definition global and
transnational. In its original and pure form, blockchain is supposed to be
borderless and cover the exchange of data, value, and other types of
transactions independent of the physical locations of the persons involved
in the transaction. Still, this does not give a fully accurate picture of the
blockchain economy. This economy is part of a specific subset of society:
the programmers, coders, and software developers who are largely

287. See generally FRISCHMANN, supra note 33, at 1 9, 91 114 (discussing various aspects of
commons management).
288. See generally Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 121 23
(1980). The politics of blockchain and the crypto community are now discussed in a series of booklength publications. See DAVID GOLUMBIA, THE POLITICS OF BITCOIN: SOFTWARE AS RIGHT-WING
EXTREMISM (2016); KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH
AND INEQUALITY (2019); FINN BRUNTON, DIGITAL CASH: THE UNKNOWN HISTORY OF THE
ANARCHISTS, UTOPIANS, AND TECHNOLOGISTS WHO CREATED CRYPTOCURRENCY (2019). See also
the discussion of the three books in Frank Pasquale, Tales from the Crypto, PUB. BOOKS (June 12,
2020), https://www.publicbooks.org/tales-from-the-crypto/#fn-36490-6 [https://perma.cc/R5AC537Z].
289. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 16 (2014); MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON
COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY (Tarleton Gillespie et al. eds., 2014); Malte Ziewitz,
Governing Algorithms: Myth, Mess, and Methods, 41 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 3, 5 (2016).
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responsible for internal blockchain governance.
Internal blockchain governance can be broadly separated into two
categories: off-chain and on-chain governance.290 Most cryptocurrencies
use off-chain governance whereby core developers and miners are the
main governance actors, and users and business entities participate as part
of the community.291 Software developments are typically achieved by
leaders in the communit . For instance, Bitcoin s off-chain consensus is
reached by large mining players, core developers, and business entities
interacting with each other and coming to an agreement.292 Off-chain
governance is thus relatively centralized and excludes many users that
lack the technical knowledge or financial power to effect network
decisions. Despite centralization, users of blockchains are granted some
flexibility through some form of exit option such as hard forks.293 Hard
forks empower users not satisfied with the governance of a network to
create their own system, in the form of a new cryptocurrency regime, by
splitting the original blockchain. Both Bitcoin and Ethereum have
experienced hard forks.294
On-chain governance is more recent in blockchains that allow more
transfer of powers from the miners and developers to the users.
Blockchains allowing on-chain governance implement some form of
direct involvement for users through on-chain voting mechanisms. Voting
and proposals for development happen transparently on-chain; voting is

290. See Wessel Reijers et al., Now the Code Runs Itself: On-Chain and Off-Chain Governance of
Blockchain Technologies, 37 TOPOI 1 (2018), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11245018-9626-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/X22H-JLYN] (comparing on-chain with off-chain governance).
See generally Walch, supra note 52 (on coders as fiduciaries in (public) blockchains). See also Philipp
Hacker, Corporate Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies?, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN:
TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 140 (Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019) (discussing the
application of complexity theory on blockchain governance).
291. See Wessel Reijers et al., supra note 290, at 2 n.2.
292. Off-chain coordination takes place via e-mails and online databases, See Bitcoin Improvement
Proposals, GITHUB, https://github.com/bitcoin/bips [https://perma.cc/5RPW-P6PA].
293. See Jeffery Atik & George Gerro, Hard Forks on the Bitcoin Blockchain: Reversible Exit,
Continuing Voice, 1 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL Y. 24 (2018).
294. See Walch, supra note 52, at 62 64. There are nowadays Bitcoin (BTC) and Bitcoin Cash
(BCH) as an altcoin. Compare Bitcoin Is an Innovative Payment Network and a New Kind of Money,
BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/ [https://perma.cc/GHL3-ACAT], with Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash,
BITCOINCASH, https://www.bitcoincash.org/ [perma.cc/Y528-R748]. There are also Ethereum (ETH)
and Ethereum Classic (ETC), whereby the latter uses the original Ethereum blockchain after the hard
fork of Ethereum that was initiated by the majority after The DAO hack took place. Compare
Ethereum Is a Global, Open-Source Platform for Decentralized Applications, ETHEREUM,
https://ethereum.org/en/ [https://perma.cc/QNG7-R5CY], with Ethereum Classic: Building
Unstoppable Applications, ETHEREUM CLASSIC, https://ethereumclassic.org/
[https://perma.cc/FXG2-H3Y8].

Dimitropoulos_UPDATED Paginated_jci(Do Not Delete)

2020]

THE LAW OF BLOCKCHAIN

10/5/2020 3:54 PM

1179

governed algorithmically and automatic execution of results is built
directly into the protocol. On-chain governance is also led by the
blockchain law-and-economics incentive structures. On-chain voting
depends on the selection of the consensus algorithm. In the PoS model,
for example, voting is weighted based on user stakes.295 Many average
users will not have enough financial resources to make a substantial
impact on decisions by stake-based voting, so this model may lead to
centralization as well.
At the same time, users of cryptoservices are free to enter, exit, and
choose the cryptoenvironment that is most suitable to their preferences
depending on the value of that environment, its internal governance rules,
as well as internal governance practices, etc. Trent MacDonald develops
a blockchain political economy of the sort discussed in the beginning of
this section that is derived from the nature of the cryptoworld that
promises the elimination of rent-seeking given the giving up of centralized
monopoly control over the constitutional rules.296 The threats to the
political and bureaucratic systems of the world by the new world proposed
by blockchain and its underlying politics will eventually lead to a
backlash297 this will be further elaborated in the next section. This may
lead to a political economy rupture that MacDonald calls
cr ptosecession. 298
From a law and political economy point of view, it remains uncertain
at this stage of development of the technology whether the government
should or could intervene in the internal governance processes of the
cryptoworld. The next section of this Article will consider this issue
further.299
C.

The Political Economy of Blockchain

This section develops a law and political economy framework for the
interaction between the law of the digital and the physical worlds. It first
explains the regulatory backlash against cryptoassets using the concepts
295. See, e.g., The Voting Process, TEZOS FOUND. (2020),
https://tezos.gitlab.io/whitedoc/voting.html [https://perma.cc/6SX6-884R] (describing voting and the
voting process on Tezos); see also Jacob Arluck, Amending Tezos: Traversing the Amendment
Process, MEDIUM (Nov. 29, 2018), https://medium.com/tezos/amending-tezos-b77949d97e1e
[https://perma.cc/K4XB-7UAF].
296. Trent J. MacDonald, Theory of Non-Territorial Internal Exit 6 7 (Feb. 1, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with SSRN), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2661226
[https://perma.cc/VFY7-8JHQ].
297. See generally Davidson et al., Economics of Blockchain, supra note 28.
298. MacDonald, supra note 296, at 3.
299. See infra section III.C.3.
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of embeddedness and the double mo ement de elopment by the
twentieth century political economist Karl Polanyi. It then identifies three
phases in the development of the law of the interaction between the
ordinary law of the physical world and the lex cryptographia of the digital
world: the anarcho-libertarian phase; the mainstreaming phase; and, the
maturity phase. All three phases feature different levels and types of
interaction between the self-regulatory lex cryptographia, and external
regulation by the ordinary law. The Article closes with a discussion of the
possible measures of regulatory intervention on behalf of the government
in an effort to embed cryptoassets into domestic economies.
1.

Explaining Regulatory Backlash

The concept of embeddedness, as defined by Polanyi and further used
by economists and economic sociologists, refers to the fact and need for
every economic activity to be embedded within institutions of society, like
institutions of kinship, religion, politics, etc., that keep economic activity
under certain control.300 In pre-nineteenth century societies, there were no
purely economic institutions outside of the frame of other societal
institutions. In the market society that appeared in the nineteenth century,
the economic system gained a certain degree of independence leading
largely to this system being dis-embedded from society, with catastrophic
results for society that eventually, according to Polanyi, led to the disaster
of the two world wars.301
According to Polanyi, the market system necessarily produces two
antithetical movements in society: one in favor of market expansion and
free trade, and equally against government intervention in the economy;
and one in favor of protective and interventionist measures prompted by
a collectivist counter-movement, in an effort to embed the market into
institutions of society.302 This is the so called Polan ian double
mo ement in societ .303 Economic and financial expansion through
cryptocurrencies and other cryptoassets, and responses to their expansion
can be explained and described in terms of the double mo ement that
Karl Polanyi identified for the expansion of the market society in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.304
300. See generally, e.g., Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem
of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOCIO. 481 (1985).
301. POLANYI, supra note 34, at 29 31.
302. Id. at 79 80, 136 40.
303. Id. at 79.
304. See REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN, supra note 12.
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Polanyi expressed the hope that post-WWII society would again
develop the appropriate institutions to re-embed the economy,305 which
was largely the case during the trente glorieuses with the various social
protection programs and schemes of the post-war welfare state. This
changed in the 1990s leading up to the 2008 global crisis. The crisis led
to a new process of the embedding and dis-embedding of market forces;
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are a peculiar case of an effort to disembed money from the mainstream financial system and possibly
(re-)embed it into new communities, such as the communities of cryptospecialists, like developers and miners. It is in this process that money
may accidentally face a new phase of extreme dis-embeddedness, and
economic liberalism may spread and expand its role and the remit of the
market process. This process may be unique in the history of the market
making it independent from any physical context, and introduced only
into the cryptoworld of blockchain.
Blockchain disrupts to some extent the narrative of the double
movement but produces the same effects in society as the double
movement does. Bitcoin, other cryptocurrencies and cryptoassets, and
ultimately blockchain technology have been produced by opponents of the
mainstream financial system in an effort to circumvent institutions such
as traditional banks.306 For possibly the first time in the history of
capitalism, a group that could be identified as the protective collectivist
counter-movement in society has contributed to the further global
expansion of the market system, including commodities, services, and
capital.
This may thus explain the emergence of a countermovement, which has
developed in order to address the potential negative effects of cryptoassets
on economy and society at large by introducing interventions in favor of
the vulnerable parties of cryptoasset transactions, and social protection
more broadly, as well as the protection of the institutions of the State. This
anti-countermovement 307 has appeared in countries like the United
States that follow the system of market economy, and countries like China
that follow their own variety of the market economy system.308
The emergence of the anti-countermovement explains the varying
responses by countries around the world to cryptocurrencies and other
de elopments of blockchain technolog . The anti-countermovement

305.
306.
307.
308.

See POLANYI, supra note 34, at 259.
See supra section II.C.2.a.
See REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN, supra note 12, at 114.
See supra section I.C. (discussing examples from the United States, China, and beyond).
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may take the guise of the countermovement and try to block the spread of
[cr ptoassets and the blockchain] in a restricti e a .309 Other forces of
the anti-countermovement may try to enable cryptoassets and
blockchain.310 Enabling is a novel effort of embedding which is
characteristic of a society that has reached the extent of globalization and
digitization of our contemporary society.311
The different Polanyian movements identified at play here face various
regulatory dilemmas regarding the embeddedness of cryptoassets and
blockchain technology into a domestic regulatory framework by
regulating them or allowing both their market and underlying technology
to develop outside the scope of domestic regulatory intervention. The
advantages of embedding cryptocurrencies into a domestic legal order
may be offset by the advantages brought about by allowing a new
innovative technology, such as blockchain technology, to flourish without
the restraints of regulation. Moreover, enabling cryptoassets through
domestic legislation brings to the fore new risks for national jurisdictions.
From a domestic go ernment s point of ie , there are man reasons
in favor of regulating cryptoassets and embedding them into a certain
domestic legal order. The pseudonymity of cryptoasset market
participants makes it difficult for regulators to identify individuals who
use them for illicit value transfers. Cryptoassets are thus very often used
for money laundering purposes.312 This creates problems of enforcement
of financial sanctions. It may also lead to tax evasion. Additionally,
cryptoasset users are exposed to various consumer risks given the price
volatility of cryptocurrencies. A related but more systemic issue is that of
monetary and financial stability a problem mostly of the future. This
obviously also creates issues of trust in currency generally. Another set of
issues is derived from the new intermediaries of the virtual currency
environment. It may well be the case that the cryptocurrency system
circumvents traditional national financial intermediaries like central and
commercial banks; at the same time, it introduces new intermediaries.
These new intermediaries are exposed to novel problems like, for
example, the risk of hacking.313
309. REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN, supra note 12, at 131.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL
AML/CFT RISKS 9 (2014).
313. See, e.g., The Mt. Gox scandal, when hackers stole 850,000 Bitcoins in February 2014 that
were more than $460 million from Mt. Gox, a Bitcoin exchange database handling at the time up to
70% of all Bitcoin transactions, showcased very vividly the technological risks that cryptocurrency
users are exposed to. Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin s $460 Million Disaster,

Dimitropoulos_UPDATED Paginated_jci(Do Not Delete)

2020]

THE LAW OF BLOCKCHAIN

10/5/2020 3:54 PM

1183

Embedding through enabling also raises at least two major concerns at
the global and domestic levels of governance that need to be mitigated:
the peril of more finance and the peril of clash of agencies.314 Since the
global financial and economic crisis, there is a general tendency at the
global, the regional, and the domestic governance levels to constrain more
conventional finance.315 At the same time, Bitcoin made its appearance on
the Internet and the global money market and a similar trend to enable
digital and virtual finance and financial technology more generally has
been growing. This has been reflected in the implementation of a new type
of law through the establishment of innovation hubs and regulatory
sandboxes.316 Enabling blockchain and FinTech raises the question of the
viability of restraining conventional finance. Both conventional financial
institutions and new startups now receive incentives from different
regulators to work around conventional finance restrictions and develop
new products that are potentially no less dangerous for consumers than
the products developed by conventional financial institutions. In the long
run, these developments may eventually lead to an overall less regulated
field of finance.
There is a second way in which regulation of cryptoassets through
enabling undermines policymaking by government that goes to the core
function of governance. As novel phenomena of the digital world,
cryptoassets may fall within the powers of many different regulators of
one country;317 cryptoassets leave space open for several agencies to
capture the empty regulatory space and regulate them as money,
commodity, technology, or otherwise. This has already led to a
paradoxical approach to regulation of cryptoassets involving multiple
WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/
[https://perma.cc/WBQ7-93FQ]. Similar problems have arisen in the frame of DAOs. In May 2016,
members of the Ethereum community announced the inception of the DAO, the first blockchain-based
DAO, also known as Genesis DAO. The DAO was built using smart contracts on the Ethereum
blockchain. In June 2016, a hacker took advantage of a vulnerability in the coding of the application
that was built on Ethereum not the Ethereum itself that allowed him to steal 3.6 million ETH,
which was the equivalent of approximately $50 million at the time. See Klint Finley, A $50 Million
Hack Just Showed that the DAO Was All Too Human, WIRED (June 18, 2016),
https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-million-hack-just-showed-dao-human/ [https://perma.cc/2LC33RT7].
314. See also REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN, supra note 12, at 130 32.
315. See generally KEVIN DAVIS, REGULATORY REFORM POST THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS:
AN OVERVIEW (2011).
316. See supra sections I.C, II.C.2.a.i.
317. Ross Leckow, Notice & Comment, Virtual Currencies the Regulatory Challenges, YALE J.
ON REGUL. 132 (2017); see also FIN. STABILITY BD., CRYPTO-ASSETS REGULATORS DIRECTORY 1
5 (2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P050419.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGP6-THP6].
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agencies. This can be seen in the United States, where several agencies
have claimed jurisdiction over cryptoassets. CFTC classifies Bitcoin and
other cryptoasset derivatives as commodities. The IRS considers Bitcoin
to be propert for U.S. federal tax purposes.318 FinCEN treats virtual
currenc as mone for purposes of the mone ser ices business (MSB)
regulations.319 The SEC has successfully argued that Bitcoin-denominated
in estments are securities that can be regulated under U.S. securities
laws.320 At the same time, governments at the state level are propelling the
enabling of cryptoassets and blockchain technology.
In the future, this situation might end up with an even greater clash of
agencies within some countries as to which regulator will regulate them
and what regulatory approach should be taken.321 Different national
agencies may have different aims: Departments of Commerce and
Ministries of Economy may typically want to create economic hubs via
enabling regulation. On the other side, Treasury Departments and
Ministries of Finance and Central Banks will have an interest in financial
stability; the banking and financial supervision authorities may be willing
to minimize the risk for market participants and consumers; anti-money
laundering agencies will be willing to assume their powers to enforce antimoney laundering legislation; commodities regulators might be entering
the regulatory arena as well, as is the case in the United States.322 The
interplay between the liberal and the collectivist countermovement are
thus replayed within domestic governments as a struggle for regulatory
and deregulatory power and competence among different agencies. At the
moment the result is an odd mixture of constraining and enabling
regulation.
This creates significant regulatory confusion, which is greater than
regulatory uncertainties caused by exclusively domestic phenomena, and
may undermine the power of the government to regulate. It may be
undermining the s mbolic po er of the go ernment as ell,323 namely
the perception of the State and its institutions in the eyes of its citizens,
further impacting its capacity to regulate. This may have very negative
results especially in countries with less well-established institutions, or
318. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 140, at 2.
319. See U.S. DEP T OF TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF T NETWORK, supra note 67.
320. See supra section I.C.
321. REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN, supra note 12, at 132.
322. Id.
323. Pierre Bourdieu, Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field, 12
SOCIO. THEORY 1, 9 (Loic J.D. Wacquant & Samar Farage trans., 1994) (discussing the symbolic
power of the State).
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when the authority of the State is also undermined by external factors, like
an economic and financial crisis or public health and national security
emergencies.
From a more bird s e e ie , the main reasons leading to the
justification of domestic regulation and potentially also of international
regulation of cryptoassets are related to new inequalities that they may
create, and have been discussed in a previous section.324
There are also reasons that may speak against moving towards
regulation and overall embeddedness of cryptoassets. The most important
reasons against regulation are related to blockchain technology.
Cryptoassets rely on algorithm-generated trustless trust.325 Regulation
might reduce trust in the technology and mathematics, which might
eventually lead to the diminishing value or even dissolution of the assets.
Moreover, there is inherent uncertainty as to how to regulate new
technologies, as well as fundamental difficulties in regulating a new
technology. The uncertainty surrounding the development potential of
new technologies, namely the fact that we do not yet know how they will
develop and be used in the future, makes regulation of new technologies
very difficult.326 Regulation may thus be an obstacle to innovation.327
Regulatory responses to cryptocurrencies threaten to increase the cost of
compliance and/or slow the development or adoption of beneficial
innovations.328 Government intervention in cryptoassets and blockchain
might stall a necessary wave of technological development and innovation
that, through economic and social spill-over effects, may benefit various
sectors of the economy and, eventually, society at large.329
324. See supra section II.C.2.a.ii.
325. De Filippi, supra note 42.
326. See generally Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation
From Facts to Data, 57 JURIMETRICS (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2808044
[https://perma.cc/NNG6-UCNQ].
327. See Luke A. Stewart, The Impact of Regulation on Innovation in the United States: A CrossIndustry
Literature
Review,
INFO.
TECH.
&
INNOVATION
FOUND.
(2010),
https://www.itif.org/files/2011-impact-regulation-innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7PZ-CSMN]
(presenting relevant literature and discussing the impact of different regulatory regimes on private
sector innovation); Knut Blind et al., The Impact of Regulation on Innovation (Nesta Working Paper,
Paper No. 12/02, 2016) (presenting empirical literature on the impact of different types of regulation
on innovation and showing a rather diverse picture regarding the type of regulation, as well as the
sectors, the companies and the time horizon of the impacts).
328. See EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NAT L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON TECH.,
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016) (regarding AI).
329. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & BRUCE C. GREENWALD, CREATING A LEARNING
SOCIETY: A NEW APPROACH TO GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 135 passim
(2014) (discussing the relationship between government intervention, innovation, and economic and
social spill-overs).
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Ordinary Law and Lex Cryptographia: Three Phases of
Development

Three different phases in the development of the interplay between the
ordinary law of the physical world and lex cryptographia may be
identified: the anarcho-libertarian phase; the mainstreaming phase; and,
the maturity phase.330 Each phase favors different aspects of blockchain
technology, and produces a different type of interaction between
blockchain and the law.
Blockchain technology and DLT have their origins in the crypto
anarchist and cypherpunk movements of the 1980s and 1990s with the
goal of promoting as widespread use of cryptography as possible, as well
as the adoption of technologies that would protect individual privacy; the
final goal was social and political change through the means of
cryptography.331 The crypto anarchist and cypherpunk movements gave
rise to similar online movements of cyberlibertarianism, i.e., the online
independence of the individual from the government.332 Bitcoin and
blockchain technology are the offspring of this intellectual and
technological tradition and were developed in an effort to by-pass the
institutions of the financial markets, namely commercial banks, as well as
central banks.333 During this anarcho-libertarian phase, blockchains were
mostly public and permissionless. Blockchains are moreover inherently
transnational constructs. 334 The are transnational because the b pass
the need for a central server (which necessarily needs to be located in a
specific jurisdiction). 335 The technology remained largely transnational
330. See also Dimitropoulos, supra note 25, at 14. The three phases are partly chronologically
overlapping.
331. The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto authored and originally circulated via e-mail in 1988 by
Timothy May, one of the founders of the crypto anarchist movement, opens in a way that mimics the
Communist Manifesto. See Timothy C. May, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, ACTIVISM:
CYPHERPUNK (Nov. 22, 1992), https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html
[https://perma.cc/F6CG-S72E]. Eric Hughes, the co-founder of the cypherpunk movement, speaks in
his Cypherpunk Manifesto of the need for a new social contract largely outside the State and with the
goal of protecting privacy; this is to be achieved using the means of cryptography. See Eric Hughes,
A Cypherpunk s Manifesto, ACTIVISM: CYPHERPUNK (Mar. 9, 1993),
https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html [https://perma.cc/J6AY-RXPN].
332. See JULIAN ASSANGE ET AL., CYPHERPUNKS: FREEDOM AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET
(2012); see also STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT SAVING
PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2002).
333. See generally Usman W. Chohan, Cryptoanarchism and Cryptocurrencies 13 (Nov. 27, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079241
[https://perma.cc/B6Y9-M94M].
334. FINCK, supra note 1, at 58.
335. De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 1.

Dimitropoulos_UPDATED Paginated_jci(Do Not Delete)

2020]

THE LAW OF BLOCKCHAIN

10/5/2020 3:54 PM

1187

in this first phase of development. In addition, in the first five to seven
years of blockchain the technology remained largely unregulated as there
was an absence of regulatory intervention by governments.336
The use of blockchains is becoming more common in many spheres of
life and business, and the quantity and value of cryptoassets is increasing
as well. Mainstream organizations such as tech giants and international
banks have more recently come to terms with a technology that was
developed to bypass them.337 The increase in uses and value of the
cryptoasset and blockchain markets has naturally attracted the interest of
regulators that have been attempting to fit cryptoassets mostly
cryptocurrencies under traditional regulatory categories. In this
mainstreaming phase, blockchains still remained public and
permissionless. It was during this phase though that an effort to
domesticate them started taking place. Domestication of blockchain is
an effort by legal orders all around the world to capture and regulate
i.e., embed into a domestic context a technology that is by nature and
design global and transnational. This is a process that may be observed
with regard to other technologies as well such as the Internet. The Internet
was conceived as a global network, but started developing a territorial
dimension, with countries around the world developing domestic laws and
other mechanisms to domesticate it.338 Domestication took place through
the means of regulation and embedding presented in previous sections of
the Article, mostly regarding cryptocurrencies. Government intervention
has been and still remains asymmetric; it sometimes favors the
technology through sandboxes and innovation hubs for some users and
uses, while at other times it is more restricting, particularly as it refers to
the transfer-of-value functions of blockchain.
The third phase may be characterized as the maturity phase of
blockchain. The public permissionless blockchains are spinning off to
private and permissioned blockchains that have started booming in the last
couple of years. Mainstream tech companies are now actively involved in
the development of the technology, and mainstream companies have
336. FINCK, supra note 1, at 46.
337. See, e.g., Wolfie Zhao, Bank of America Files for 3 New Blockchain Patents, COINDESK (Aug.
1, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/bank-america-files-3-new-blockchain-patents
[https://perma.cc/AD9Y-24BT] (discussing the three blockchain-related patents filed by the Bank of
America).
338. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF
A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006) (on the ways through which the attempts to control the Internet by
powerful States has led to a rediscovery of some of the old functions and justifications for territorial
government); Nicholas Tsagourias, The Legal Status of Cyberspace, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 13, 17 (Nicholas Tsagourias & Russell Buchan eds., 2015).
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started using the technology to improve their operations. In this maturity
phase, there are blockchains of all types: domestic, transnational, and also
international, as governments and international organizations have
developed uses for blockchain. Regulation has started shifting towards
adoption of blockchain for government service delivery. Regulation and
adoption now take place at the domestic, international, and also regional
level of governance.339 In the United States, no consistent policy may be
identified. At the state level, agencies seem to be moving towards
promotion and adoption; at the federal level, the clash of agencies is only
a symptom of incoherence at the policymaking level.
3.

Government Intervention: Publicness, Trust, Interoperability

Blockchain technology and the applications it supports pose great
challenges to law as a system, and domestic legal systems. Domestic
jurisdictions have been faced with great challenges particularly when
dealing with cryptoassets. On the other side, blockchain technology is
faced with great challenges stemming from data protection-related laws,
such as the GDPR in the European Union.340 Most data protection laws
were developed for the centralized collection, storage, and processing of
personal data.341 It becomes very difficult to transpose this logic to
decentralized digital ledgers. The greatest challenge for the future
becomes to protect individuals from the risks of cryptoassets including
cybersecurity and hacking breaches while at the same time allowing for
technological innovation.
The infrastructural understanding of blockchain as well as the
discussion of the different phases of the interaction between blockchain
and ordinary law help in developing a law and political economy
framework of blockchain for the future shaping of the interaction between
the law of the digital and the physical world. One may think of the
339. See EU Blockchain Observatory & Forum, EUR. UNION BLOCKCHAIN,
https://www.eublockchainforum.eu/ [https://perma.cc/S8LX-4M6N]. The European Union has also
launched an E.U. Observatory and Forum and is in the process of developing a European Union-wide
blockchain infrastructure. Id.; see also ROBBY HOUBEN & ALEXANDER SNYERS, EUR. PARLIAMENT
SPECIAL COMM. ON FIN. CRIMES, TAX EVASION & TAX AVOIDANCE, CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND
BLOCKCHAIN: LEGAL CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL CRIME, MONEY LAUNDERING
AND TAX EVASION (2018),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150761/TAX3%20Study%20on%20cryptocurrencies%20an
d%20blockchain.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY99-TZU6]; Communication from the Eur. Comm n to the
Eur. Parliament, the Council, the Eur. Cent. Bank, the Eur. Econ. and Soc. Comm. and the Comm. of
the Regions, COM (2018) 767 final (Nov. 28, 2018); European Countries Join Blockchain
Partnership, EUR. COMM N (Apr. 10, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-singlemarket/en/news/european-countries-join-blockchain-partnership [https://perma.cc/3SYK-2PFF].
340. See supra section I.C.
341. See FINCK, supra note 1, at 103.
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following three principles and values as essential in this interaction:
enabling public and permissionless blockchains; establishing new
foundations of trust in society; and achieving new interoperability
functions between the public and private sectors, as well as the physical
and the digital world.
As has been observed above, there has been a general tendency in the
more recent phases of development of blockchain technology to move
away from public and permissionless blockchains and towards private and
permissioned blockchains. Providing free access to all network
participants has been the major innovation of blockchain technology. The
pri ati ation of blockchain ma potentiall stifle inno ation, as ell as
create new dichotomies between those with access and those without
access to blockchain. Legislators and regulators could think of ways to
again favor public and permissionless blockchain networks. The
government may thus consider further streamlining funding into activities
relating to the promotion of public and permissionless blockchains. The
government may be called upon in the future to develop governmentbased blockchains; in addition, it may have to interfere to develop
alternatives in cases that certain services are provided on permissioned
blockchains by private corporations, particularly in the sphere of
cryptocurrencies, or potentially other cryptoassets that may in the future
be viewed as essential.
Law differentiates itself from other social systems as it embodies a trust
inculcated into it through mechanisms of government action such as
legislation by the legislative branch of government and regulation by the
executive branch of government. For certain actions of societal life that
are perceived as needing to be infused with such trust, the law lends its
trust quality to such transactions. Transactions in land, for example,
require notarization by a notary as well as registration with the land
registry.342 So far, the government has always operated as the mediator of
this type of trust in order to safeguard trust in the relevant system. Now,
blockchain purports to take up some of these roles by being the generator
of trust. The question thus arises as to what extent peer-to-peer trust in
blockchain can replace trust in and by the government. The interplay
between these two systems of trust, and the use of the blockchain trust
mechanism by government is very important for the law and political
economy framing of blockchain. Legislative interventions could allow for
trust in blockchain to operate with the support of governmental trust. The
government could intervene to support blockchain networks in cases of
failure to react to the needs of the law and the realities of the physical
342. See supra sections II.B.1, I.A.2.b.
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world. One example may be legislative provisions such as in (civil) codes,
as well as financial and consumer law provisions mandating the reversal
of blockchain transactions that would qualify as irregular under the
ordinary legal system.
More broadly, the way to mitigate the dangers of embedding through
enabling as well as allowing for an interplay between the trust
mechanisms of government and blockchains may be by regulating the new
cryptoasset and blockchain intermediaries, as opposed to intervening in
the internal governance processes of the cryptocommunity or otherwise
regulating the operations of developers or individual miners. Cryptoasset
and blockchain intermediaries can be used as regulator agents, 343 and
be subjected to various types of regulation such as command-and-control
regulation. The BitLicense framework may be viewed as a regulatory
effort in this direction.344
One of the main themes of globalization of law was the effort to
understand new institutions and organizations that present features of
hybridity between the public and the private sectors. The Fourth Industrial
revolution also produces a post-industrial globalization.345 The new legal
questions posed by globalization through the application of blockchain
technology are not issues of hybridity; they are rather issues of
interoperability of different systems:346 at the private to private level; at
the private to government level; and, at the government to government
level. Trade is a case in point.347 Blockchain technology can potentially
facilitate the various dimensions of private to private, private to
government, and government to government interactions involved,
whether they are cross-border or not. Blockchain can facilitate technical
interoperability allowing IT systems of private parties and different
agencies to communicate with each other.348 The problem is that at the
moment there are different blockchain worlds designed by different
developers that are in competition with each other. Paolo Tasca and
Riccardo Piselli present three different scenarios in order to address the

343. Marian, supra note 13, at 66. See generally GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 338 (discussing
regulatory access points that can be used for regulatory purposes).
344. See supra section I.C.
345. See supra section II.B.1.
346. See FINCK, supra note 1, at 152; Tasca & Piselli, supra note 153, at 35 40.
347. See generally GANNE, supra note 4 (discussing the use of blockchain in cross-border trade).
348. See ISO/TC 307: Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technologies, INT L ORG. FOR
STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/committee/6266604.html [https://perma.cc/JDH2-6PGG]
(ISO is in the process of elaborating technical and interoperability standards for blockchain and
distributed ledgers).
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current problem of non-interoperabilit 349 of various blockchains: the
emergence of a single prevalent system, the affirmation of intermediary
blockchain systems, or the adoption of middleware software that has the
technological capabilities to serve as an intermediary technology for
communication.350 Government may in the future require the digitization
and storage on blockchain of various documents, and make
interoperability mandatory in one of the ways suggested here.
The infrastructural re-interpretation of blockchain helps us understand
that interoperability may even have to go beyond that. The digital world
of blockchain and the physical world do not always operate in the
originally envisaged isolation. There are multiple access-points of the
physical world into the digital blockchain world, and vice versa.351 A new
law and political economy framework for blockchain needs to also
guarantee interoperability between the physical and the digital world by
bridging the gaps between the physical and the non-physical world.
Regulating access points, such as intermediaries, would accomplish this.
One could potentially think of government interventions in the lex
cryptographia and the cryptocommunity, by for example structuring
arbitrations resolving disputes arising out of smart contracts, or regulating
miners and mining pools. In the last scenario, a regulatory intervention for
the regulation of mining pools, rather than individual miners would be
closer to the here envisaged law and political economy framework for
blockchain.
CONCLUSION
Blockchain technology is a new general-purpose technology that poses
great challenges to society and the law. The lex cryptographia of
blockchain has been designed based on the rational choice assumption of
human behavior. The Article suggests that this is not a sufficient
foundation for the future development of blockchain, and claims that it is
necessary to develop a law and political economy framework of
blockchain and its regulation through code. An infrastructural reinterpretation of blockchains as commons may help towards this direction.
A law and political economy framework may mean the active
involvement of government in the future shaping of blockchain. This will
deterministically lead to the need in the future to resolve issues of

349. Tasca & Piselli, supra note 153, at 36.
350. Id. at 40.
351. See FINCK, supra note 1, at 86 (speaking of bridges ); supra section II.C.2.a.i.
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regulatory capture and failure.352 As the political economy of the law of
blockchain will become more intricate and multilayered, it is important to
already lay the right foundations during the first steps of its development.

352. See Rahman, Infrastructural Regulation, supra note 212, at 931 32 (discussing issues of
regulatory capture and failure in the new infrastructure economies).

